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Since 1944, naval special warfare (NSW) commanders and staffs have led battalion (O-5, 
U.S. Navy commander) and brigade (O-6, U.S. Navy captain) echelon task forces 
charged with conducting conventional and irregular warfare. History reveals that these 
duties often come with little or no notice, as experienced in Operations Desert Storm and 
Enduring Freedom. For more than a decade following Enduring Freedom, these 
requirements increased in frequency and scope. Now NSW routinely provides senior 
leadership to joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multinational task forces. Yet 
current development efforts focus on building world-class individual operators and small 
units as opposed to senior leaders. This research employs a systems approach to analyze 
NSW’s professional development program. The project commenced by reviewing 
pertinent historical, doctrinal, and academic contributions. Next, a survey tapped into the 
experience of senior SEALs—leaders who ran deployed task forces (e.g., NSW task 
groups and task forces). Participants assessed the current system, prioritized aspects of 
the profession, and made recommendations to enhance development. Feedback revealed 
consensus regarding the desire to enhance development through institutional courses 
designed to prepare SEALs for senior assignments. The data help to define the NSW 
profession by better identifying and prioritizing the practical skills required by SEAL 
leaders today. 
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Since World War II, naval special warfare (NSW) commanders and staffs have led 
battalion (O-5, U.S. Navy commander) and brigade (O-6, U.S. Navy captain) echelon 
task forces charged with conducting conventional and irregular warfare. Moreover, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) directs NSW to maintain this capability (translated by the 
enterprise into force training and force readiness manuals). History reveals that these 
duties often come with little or no notice, as experienced in Operations Desert Storm and 
Enduring Freedom. For more than a decade following Enduring Freedom, the 
requirement to lead battalion and brigade echelon forces increased in frequency and 
scope. Now NSW routinely provides senior leadership to joint, inter-agency, inter-
governmental, and multinational (JIIM) task forces. Yet current development efforts 
focus on building world-class individual operators and small-unit elements, as opposed to 
senior leaders. Additionally, despite current requirements, there is little consensus on how 
to develop SEALs for these senior roles. Therefore, defining the NSW profession 
requires both the identification and prioritization of echelon-specific development 
requirements.  
This research employs a systems approach to analyze NSW’s professional 
development program. The project commenced by reviewing pertinent historical, 
doctrinal, and academic contributions. Next, a survey tapped into the experience gained 
by senior members of the community—leaders who spent the last 13-plus years running 
deployed task forces (e.g., NSW task groups and task forces). Participants assessed the 
current system, prioritized aspects of the profession and provided recommendations for 
future development. Feedback revealed consensus regarding the desire to enhance 
development through institutional courses designed to prepare SEALs for senior 
assignments. The data helps to define the NSW profession by better prioritizing practical 
skills required by SEAL leaders today. Finally, combining qualitative and quantitative 
analysis revealed five key findings, which were used to derive three recommendations for 
improving NSW’s professional development pipeline. 
 
 xviii
Project Findings  
1. Ongoing Requirement: History and military directive compel NSW to 
prepare for leadership roles (command and staff positions) on O-5 and O-6 
echelon task forces. 
2. Liability: Survey participants confirm the need and strongly recommend 
improving NSW’s professional development to better prepare senior joint 
warfighters. The data demonstrate that NSW currently relies too heavily 
on individual experience or on-the-job training (OJT) to prepare for these 
roles.  
3. NSW Profession Defined: This research produced a prioritized list of the 
practical skills required by SEALs today (Appendix A). This list is a 
starting point or an extrapolation of NSW’s 2014 professional 
development priorities as related to this echelon of joint warfare.  
4. Specific NSW Education: NSW requires deliberate and echelon-specific 
military preparation, which synchronizes formal (military education and 
training, study of doctrine) and informal (mentorship, self-study, 
professional associations) methods designed to achieve a desired 
outcome—proficiency in the practical skills required by joint warfighters.  
5. Timing: Sufficient development must be completed prior to first key 
assignment at this echelon. 
Project Recommendations 
1. Place greater emphasis on deployed senior leadership skills and seek 
immediate investment in existing professional development opportunities 
that cover the subjects contained in this research (Appendix A). To 
achieve this goal the community must broadcast this objective 
(proficiency in O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leadership roles) as the 
desired end state for officers, chief warrant officers, and enlisted members 
to work toward. Further research must also be commissioned to identify 
how to implement improved professional development using the 
methodology and data contained in this research. 
2. Mandate feedback from SEALs who are privileged with key leadership 
opportunities so that the community may learn from their experiences. 
Archive these records to create a valuable database so that NSW can 
monitor progress and continuously refine the development process.  
3. NSW-specific leadership development is necessary but not sufficient for 
continued success. Therefore, further research should also identify how to 
complement military development with exposure to civilian programs 
(civilian education, fellowships, etc.). 
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 1
I. THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE PROFESSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since their inception, SEALs have supported conventional combat operations as 
well as led a variety of highly visible irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) 
efforts. The naval special warfare (NSW) community’s proven track record and talented 
people make it a key sub-component of the U. S. Special Operation Command 
(USSOCOM or SOCOM). However, violent extremists appear resilient despite 13 
consecutive years of United States and allied tactical domination of the battlefield. Due to 
the absence of decisive victory, many are concerned that traditional career paths fail to 
properly develop U.S. military leaders.1 Furthermore, the nation increasingly looks to 
SOCOM not only for quick tactical solutions like hostage rescue or direct action missions 
but also for broader leadership regarding national security challenges.2 In testimony to a 
U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Linda Robinson, a prominent analyst of U.S. 
national security and foreign policy claimed: “There is no more important issue to 
national security than making sure that special operations forces are developed and 
employed in a way that maximizes their full potential because they will very likely 
continue to play a disproportionately large role relative to their size in ensuring U.S. 
national security in the years ahead.”3 Acknowledging the complexity of future security 
challenges, the commander of SOCOM directed special operations sub-components to 
“be the best educated and trained force within the Department of Defense (DOD).4  
Despite seemingly simple guidance, this remains a complex, multi-variable 
problem. Moreover, there are no established processes for honing specific competencies 
that span the entire profession and specifically build senior special operations leaders. 
                                                 
1 John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Lanham, MD: 
Ivan R Dee, 2008), ix-xii. 
2 U.S. House of Representatives, Counsel on Foreign Relations, Linda Robinson’s comments during a 
hearing on the “Future of Special Operations Forces,” July 11, 2012. 
3 H.R., Linda Robinson’s comments on the “Future of Special Operations Forces.” 
4 U.S. Special Operations (USSOCOM) Commander, Commander’s Education and Training 
Guidance FY 13–16, Policy letter, MacDill, Air Force Base: USSOCOM, 2013, 1. 
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The topic of development remains hotly debated by special operations professionals due 
to competing interests (e.g., status, resourcing, and operational methodology) within 
SOCOM.5 Changes or updates require careful navigation around legal, career, and 
budgetary constraints. Analysis must remain community-specific because the system 
relies primarily on service (Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and service 
component requirements (e.g., NSW) as the drivers for development.6 Despite these 
complexities, this study will attempt to support NSW’s compliance with the directive by 
researching the following questions.  
First, what are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader 
today? Second, are NSW’s future leaders being adequately prepared 
in these competencies? 
To answer these questions, this study advances prior research conducted by three 
SEALs and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). Primarily, this focuses on 
work completed by Commander (USN) Thomas Donovan, who is a Naval Postgraduate 
School graduate.7 Captain (USN) Matt Stevens’ master’s thesis was also considered.8 
Additionally, research completed by NPS graduate Lieutenant Commander (USN) David 
Nash was also reviewed.9  In 2008, JSOU researched what and how to meet the needs of 
the special operations education. This research included appraising previous professional 
development programs, soliciting input from SOCOM’s sub-components, interviewing 
senior leadership, and conducting a survey.10 The JSOU survey asked joint-service 
participants to rate “31 education areas.”11 The results from the survey revealed NSW’s 
                                                 
5 Stephen M. Grenier, David Tucker, and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations 
Forces (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007). 143-154. 
6 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), The Navy Leader Development Strategy,  
Naval Policy Letter, Washington, DC:  Department of the Navy, 2012. 3-15.     
7 For full thesis see Thomas A. Donovan, Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer 
Professional Military Education (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
8 For full thesis see Matt P. Stevens, The Missing Link: Professional Military Education in the Navy 
SEAL Officer Corps (master’s thesis, U.S. Marine Corps University, 2007).  
9 For full thesis see David F. Nash, Structuring Naval Special Warfare’s Lead Chief Petty Officer’s 
Combat Leadership Course (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
10 Joint Special Operations University President’s Action Team, Future Concept: Providing the 
Azimuth for Joint SOF Education (MacDill, Air Force Base: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2008), 2.  
11 Joint Special Operations University, Future Concept, 6.  
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top five educational requirements: irregular warfare, strategic level planning, operational 
level planning, combating terrorism—interagency executive level, and interagency 
collaboration.12 Although relevant to the discussion, these projects do not identify 
echelon-specific practical skills (a distinct concept) required for SEAL leaders.  
Building on these findings, this study brought three factors to bear. First, it 
specifically defined the desired outcome for officers, chief warrant officers, and enlisted 
SEALs. Second, it tapped into the experience gained by senior members of the NSW 
community—leaders who spent the last 13-plus years running deployed task forces (e.g., 
squadrons, special operations task forces, combined joint special operations). Thirdly, it 
collated this experience, which allowed for an objective assessment of the current 
process, identification and prioritization of areas for new investment, and collected 
suggestions about future requirements. This study was designed to help improve NSW’s 
process for developing the talent required to staff, plan, and lead joint, inter-agency, 
inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) task forces in combat and contingency 
operations. Before commencing, other contributions relevant to this discussion are 
reviewed in the next section. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW: HISTORICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND 
ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROFESSION  
Over the last 52 years, the NSW enterprise produced some of the most tactically 
proficient and highly capable combat forces on the planet. From their earliest days, 
special operations relied on a bottom-up strategy to develop individual and small unit 
excellence.13  In fact, most discussions about Navy Combat Demolition Units, Scouts and 
Raiders, and Office of Strategic Services Maritime Units focus on the exploits of small 
elements. For example, early underwater demolition teams (UDTs) serving in World War 
II worked in small teams, providing significant demolition expertise and amphibious 
                                                 
12 Joint Special Operations University, Future Concept, 40.  
13 John W. Chambers II, “Training for War and Espionage: Office of Strategic Services Training 
during World War II,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 1, 2–5.     
 4
support to conventional forces.14  In Vietnam, it is well documented that 14-man platoons 
led by SEAL lieutenants (O-3s) operated with little or no direct supervision.15 Because 
less emphasis is placed on NSW’s leadership of higher-level organizations, one of the 
initial hypotheses was that it was a relatively recent phenomenon (circa 2001); but this is 
not the case.  
1. Historical Examples of SEAL led O-5 and O-6 Task Forces  
Since at least 1944, NSW commanders and staffs led battalion (O-5, U.S. Navy 
Commander) and brigade (O-6, U.S. Navy captain) echelon task forces charged with 
conducting conventional and irregular warfare. UDT Captain (USN) B. Hall Hanlon 
deployed to the Pacific and led a task force in World War II.16  He exercised “operational 
control of all participating UDTs, amphibious personnel destroyers, and close fire-
support ships.”17 In 1967, members of the newly formed SEAL teams deployed as an O-5 
led task force called Naval Special Warfare Group-Vietnam.18 During that same period, 
SEALs also manned and led another O-5 echelon command called the Maritime 
Operations Group (also known as USMACV SOG-37).19 After Vietnam, SEALs 
episodically deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces during contingency operations 
such as for Operation Earnest Will in 1987.20  
                                                 
14 Tim L. Bosiljevac, SEALs: UDT/SEAL operations in Vietnam (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 
1990), 3. 
15 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London, UK: Routledge Press, 1998), 116-148. 
16 Tom Hawkins, “Navy Combat Demolition Units, Scouts and Raiders, Office of Strategic Services, 
Underwater Demolition Teams,” in United States Naval Special Warfare, ed. Greg Mathieson Sr. & David. 
Gatley (Centerville, VA: NSW Publications LLC, 2013). 44-45. 
17 Hawkins, “Navy Combat Demolition Units, Scouts and Raiders, Office of Strategic Services, 
Underwater Demolition Teams,” 44-45.  
18 Hawkins, “SEALs and Special Boat Teams 1960s–1987,” 71-79.  
19 Email (U), CAPT Norm Olson, NSW Historian, to LCDR Jeremiah Teti, NPS Student, October 24, 
2014. 
20 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare, 213 -
215. 
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In August 1990, NSW deployed an O-6 level command in support of Operation 
Desert Shield / Storm.21 According to NSW community documents, NSW Task Group—
Central was “unprecedented” in size and scope of mission for the community.22 That 
organization commanded four SEAL platoons and two special boat units during the 
completion of over 270 combat missions.23 History reveals that the U.S. Navy and 
SOCOM expect the SEAL community to run task forces for both combat and 
contingency operations. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan opened significant opportunities for SEALs to 
lead larger multi-service and multi-national organizations. In 2001, SEAL Captain (USN) 
Robert Harward commanded a 2,500-man Joint-service and Multi-national Task Force in 
Afghanistan.24 Since then, SEALs have routinely commanded similar echelon task forces 
around the globe. NSW now boasts former theater special operations commanders (e.g., 
Vice Admiral Albert Calland), joint special operations commanders (e.g., Admiral 
William McRaven), and SOCOM commanders (e.g., Admiral Eric Olsen).25 Regardless 
of historic precedence, SEALs now serve at the highest levels of joint command. In light 
of these assignments, it is appropriate to assess whether or not legacy development 
strategies sufficiently prepare senior SEALs for roles at higher echelons.  
2. Starting Point: NSW Current Development Focus  
In 2007, SEAL Lieutenant Commander Tom Donovan published a master’s 
thesis, which established a need for enhanced junior officer professional military 
education (PME) prior to assignment as a platoon commander.26 His work provided an 
overview of the community, a description of the current officer PME pipeline, and an 
                                                 
21 Department of the Navy, Lessons Learned Case Study - Operation Desert Shield / Storm (Naval 
Special Warfare Publication 3–1). Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1996. 3–2. 
22 Department of the Navy, Lessons Learned Case Study - Operation Desert Shield / Storm, 3–2. 
23 Department of the Navy, Lessons Learned Case Study - Operation Desert Shield / Storm, 13–1. 
24 Department of the Navy, Navy Special Warfare (NSW Publication 3–05). Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 2013. 1:7.  
25 Navy Admiral Biographies are listed: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp, 2014. 
26 Donovan, “Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Professional Military Education,” 54-
57.  
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inter-service comparison (USMC, Army, and Air Force).27 In response, the community 
commenced rank appropriate development for the platoon echelon (both officers and 
enlisted SEALs). Since NSW remains primarily focused on these junior leaders, there is 
an opportunity to complement Donovan’s research by looking at senior-level 
development.  
As previously mentioned, senior SEAL officers, chief warrant officers, and senior 
enlisted advisors are now tasked with leading increasingly larger organizations with 
greater frequency. Improvements to the community’s future leader development must 
also include those individuals (as opposed to just officers). To support this objective, the 
following sections examine two ideas. The first posits that NSW leaders receive limited 
development (training, education, and experience) specifically focused on preparing them 
for higher echelon leadership roles. The second suggests that NSW leaders require 
specific development programs (e.g., irregular warfare, maritime operations). To examine 
these ideas will require a brief review of professional development concepts, policy, and 
background. 
3. Professional Development: Concepts and Terms 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey presents 
the military as “the Profession of Arms.”28 In terms of responsibility, leadership, and 
mission importance, he equates military service to civilian professional careers and 
encourages all service members to uphold those “attributes” of excellence.29 According to 
the CJCS, the purpose of the profession is joint warfighting.30 Inherent to this profession 
are requirements for members to understand national power and influence, formulate 
informed security recommendations, work with a wide variety of partners, and remain 
prepared for an array of security scenarios (asymmetric threats, irregular and both 
                                                 
27 Donovan, “Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Professional Military Education”, 1–
48. 
28 Martin E. Dempsey, “America’s Military: A Profession of Arms” (white paper, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012). 3. 
29 Dempsey, “America’s Military: A Profession of Arms,” 1. 
30 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, DOD 
Directive CJCSI 1800.01D, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b, A-A-2. 
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conventional and unconventional warfare).31 However, professional level expertise is not 
developed immediately; rather, these complex skills must be developed throughout an 
entire career.32 Therefore, the concept remains arbitrary without a pipeline that 
consistently produces quality subspecialty (i.e., special operations) professionals.  
Under the Department of Defense’s (DOD) architecture, the pipeline uses a 
combination of “how to do” training and “how to think” education to professionally 
develop service members.33 Education is defined as academic endeavors that encourage 
“breadth of view, diverse perspectives, critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with 
ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, 
non-linear problems.”34 In contrast, training improves military task-specific 
competence.35 Therefore, this project defines development in the profession of arms as an 
overarching concept that produces joint warfighter skills in leaders. Moreover, it 
extrapolates the same requirements for the NSW profession. To be clear, this project does 
not suggest that everyone should be trained to be an admiral; rather, this is a practical 
goal emphasizing purposeful preparation for deployment skills required at senior levels. 
4. Policy and Background 
Although currently ad hoc, many professional development opportunities (e.g., 
education, training, fellowships) already exist for special operations forces. The 
Department of Defense relies on the services and sub-components to create “service-
specific proficiencies.”36 For example, “Army, Navy, and Marine Corps schools focus on 
land, maritime, and expeditionary warfare, respectively.”37 Next, the SOCOM 
commander’s role as a unified combatant commander makes him responsible for 
                                                 
31 U.S. Special Operations Command, Commander’s Special Operations Professional Education, 4–5. 
32 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), The Navy Leader Development Strategy, 10.     
33 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-1, A-2. 
34 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-2. 
35 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-2. 
36 U.S. House of Representatives, “Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two 
Decades After the Goldwater- Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel,” 2010, XI. 
37 H.R., “Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel,” 2010, XI. 
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preparing his force to conduct special operations.38 Finally, NSW shoulders the 
responsibility for institutional preparation specific to maritime special operations. To 
achieve these goals, services and sub-component commands conduct internal training, 
joint exercises, micro-educational venues, and other methods to develop role specific 
expertise within their communities. However, professional military education (PME) 
remains the primary method for preparing military members for senior leadership 
positions. Navigating existing requirements remains a complex task because four 
hierarchical policies govern NSW’s professional development.  
The first and most important policy is the law. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates qualifications and 
education prior to certain career milestones.39 Therefore, NSW remains subject to and 
benefits from participation in DOD, Navy, and SOCOM development opportunities and 
career requirements. These events include joint professional education (JPME) 
requirements, opportunities for service schools or civilian equivalents, senior War 
College and various civilian programs (i.e., educational and fellowships).40  
There are significant professional development opportunities for the NSW 
community; however, currently there is no pipeline specifically designed to develop 
senior special operations leaders within NSW. The complexity of the current policies 
combined with the lack of a deliberate NSW pipeline suggests that the system is sub-
optimal. Furthermore, this review did not uncover evidence of significant investment in 
the development (training, education, and experience) of higher echelon leadership skills. 
The question remains: Do existing opportunities sufficiently develop NSW senior leaders 
as joint warfighters? 
                                                 
38 U.S. Special Operations Command, Commander’s Special Operations Professional Education, 3. 
39 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 
40 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), The Navy Leader Development Strategy, 13.     
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5. Program of Focused Preparation 
The special operations profession remains largely undefined. The JSOU report 
identifies several common misperceptions affecting preparation.41 As previously 
discussed, current policies use a binary divide between training and education. In fact, 
JSOU limits its efforts to “the operational and strategic education” of special operations 
personnel and leaves tactical training to component commands.42 However, as this 
research will explore, development of joint warfighters requires purposefully 
synchronized training, education, especially at higher echelons. To explore this idea it is 
imperative to answer the following question: Does general education create better joint 
warfighters?  
While broadly beneficial to the individual, general education venues do not 
necessarily develop the specific skills that are required for effectiveness in senior NSW 
assignments. It is possible, that certain types of education could dilute rather than 
reinforce special operations leader effectiveness.  Although speaking generally about 
military professional education, Army War College Professor Steven Metz commented,  
No other profession feels compelled to take time away from the focused 
development of professional skills for the broadening of its senior leaders, 
or to assign them scholarly tasks only loosely related to what they will do 
during the remainder of their professional careers.43  
The key is to distinguish professional skills (or desired outcomes) from broad 
spectrum education. While Special Operations personnel need both, professionals require 
specific training and education. The framework for this argument is derived from the 
following published works. 
a. Military Professional Development History 
Three books discuss the origin and fundamental argument for creating 
professional military leaders that are specifically developed for their roles. Samuel 
                                                 
41 Joint Special Operations University, Future Concept, 8–11. 
42 Joint Special Operations University, Future Concept, 9. 
43 Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: Rethinking War Colleges and the Education of U.S. Military 
Leaders.” World Politics Review (September 2014), doi: 12372. 
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Huntington wrote the first one in 1957, which is titled The Soldier and the State. Charles 
White, author of the second, wrote The Enlightened Soldier in 1989. These two works are 
critical to building a full understanding of the idea of military professional development 
because they review the origin. Both prominent historians attribute this concept to the 
nineteenth century Prussian Army.44  Although this section focuses on the origin, a noted 
sociologist named Morris Janowitz described the transition and development of American 
military professionalism in his book titled The Professional Soldier: A Social and 
Political Portrait.45 
Samuel Huntington claimed that institutionalized military professionalism was 
born on August 6, 1808.46 On that day, the Prussian government standardized selection 
requirements for officers.47 Previously, family lineage rather than military qualification 
determined who led on the battlefield.48 Prior to this period, it was commonly believed 
that valor and combat proficiency were innate to certain leaders, rather than learned.49 
The new policy supported objective standards that were founded by balancing education, 
training, and experience.50 Huntington elaborated on the profession by suggesting that 
similar to civilian professionals, military leaders require progressive development 
strategies and a shared identity or “corporate nature” within the community.51  
Huntington’s book documents the history behind the need for rigorous military 
qualification and corporate collaboration (i.e., professional associations and journals) 
designed to further the profession.  
                                                 
44 For a full discussion see Charles E. White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the 
Militarische Gesellschaft (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1989). 
45 For a full discussion see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 1960). 
46 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 30. 
47 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 30. 
48 White, The Enlightened Soldier, 35. 
49 White, The Enlightened Soldier, 18. 
50 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 30–31. 
51 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 10. 
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Charles White attributed this radical change in policy to the Prussian General 
Gerhard Johann David Waitz von Scharnhorst.52 Although not as famous as his student 
Carl von Clausewitz, Scharnhorst’s reforms improved the effectiveness of the entire 
Prussian military.53 He designed the reorganization of the army into combined arms 
divisions, created “better education for officers and noncommissioned officers,” and 
developed an examination-based promotion system.54 Scharnhorst also warned,: 
“Nothing is more dangerous here than using personal experience without regard for that 
experience which military history teaches us.”55 Two hundred and six years ago, the 
Prussians identified a system to prepare their officers and non-commissioned leaders in 
the application of opponent-centric conventional warfare, including the complex and 
dynamic use of combined arms. Moreover, they had also learned not to overly rely on on-
the-job training. 
b. Examining How to Professionally Develop NSW Senior Leaders 
In the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, William Lind argued that it is imperative 
combat leaders be prepared via specific military programs. He described tactics as “a 
process combining two elements, techniques and education to find unique solutions to 
various combat scenarios.” 56 In discussing techniques or maneuvers, he insisted that they 
must be standardized in support of establishing a “common language.”57 However, he 
also advised “good techniques are not enough.”58 According to Lind, military education 
should include constant and career-long exposure to “military history, war-gaming, and 
terrain walks.”59 Lind defined the study of military history as practical analysis of tactical 
and operational case studies, and mentorship through war-gaming scenarios.  
                                                 
52 White, The Enlightened Soldier, xiii. 
53 White, The Enlightened Soldier, 15. 
54 White, The Enlightened Soldier, Xii, 19. 
55 White, The Enlightened Soldier, 91. 
56 William S. Lind, and Michael D. Wyly, Maneuver warfare handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985), 12 
57 Lind and Wyly, Maneuver warfare handbook, 12. 
58 Lind and Wyly, Maneuver warfare handbook, 12. 
59 Lind and Wyly, Maneuver warfare handbook, 12. 
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Additionally, Lind recommended that beginners should focus on developing 
proficiency and understanding “two levels up” from their assigned position.60 As applied 
to SEAL teams, lieutenants should first be educated and trained to run a troop (O-4 level) 
and squadron (O-5 level) before they are instructed at the platoon level (O-3). Lind 
recommended that this same sequence should be used to prepare higher-level echelon 
leaders.61 Using this training approach, lower-level leaders and their superiors then share 
a common language, increase organizational trust and confidence thus enhancing 
flexibility and decision-making up and down the chain of command. 
c. Special Operations Peculiar Skills  
The nation expects special operations personnel to master certain skills inherent to 
the profession. For example, SOCOM was designated as the proponent for security force 
assistance (SFA), which remains a term typically synonymous with irregular warfare.62 
Moreover, political leaders routinely receive reports stating that NSW plays a key role in 
irregular warfare and are also the nation’s premier maritime special operations force.63 
For example, NSW is described at the congressional level as maritime experts “postured 
to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat.”64  These congressional reports also 
state that NSW forces are capable of quickly deploying from Navy ships and 
submarines.65 However, SOF cannot train and educate for everything. In a resource and 
time constrained environment, how does SOF in general and NSW in particular prioritize 
their tasks?  
                                                 
60 Lind and Wyly, Maneuver warfare handbook, 42. 
61 Lind and Wyly, Maneuver warfare handbook, 42. 
62 Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service Paper, Defense Technical Information Center—RS21048, 2014, 2. 
63 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and 
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Paper, Defense Technical Information Center—
RS22373, 2014, 1, 4. 
64 Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress,” 5. 
65 Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress,” 5. 
 13
d. Factors to Consider and the Special Operations Dilemma  
A recent article in Joint Forces Quarterly points out the dilemma faced by all 
military service PME programs.66 The dilemma is weighing additional programs against 
both limited time and resources.67 Because no additional time or money is available, the 
authors conclude that “fundamental change in the existing training and education venues” 
is preferable over the addition of anything new.68 Therefore, defining the NSW 
profession requires both the identification and prioritization of echelon-specific 
development requirements.  
Defining special operations is a popular but divisive topic. In United States 
Special Operations Forces, defense scholars David Tucker and Christopher Lamb 
highlight the differences between conventional and special operations.69 The book 
describes a special versus elite dilemma and suggests special operations forces remain 
overly focused on high-level conventional proficiency.70 The authors argued that special 
operations forces should focus on developing unconventional skills, which provide the 
nation a more effective range of options. While these authors argued against remaining 
too conventional and broadly described some aspects of unconventional warfare, they did 
not sufficiently define the practical skills required by the special operations profession.  
Several modern military thinkers take an opposing view. For example, historian 
Douglas Porch warned that history demonstrates that good conventional soldiers can 
succeed in irregular warfare scenarios; however, special operations forces remain 
severely limited when applied against conventional enemies.71 Porch advocates the 
dominance of conventional or direct lines of effort in warfare.72 Adding to the weight of 
                                                 
66 Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Matthew Bain, and David Pavlik. “Joint PME,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly 74 / 3rd QTR 2014, 65–71.  
67 Keister et al., “Joint PME,” 69.  
68 Keister et al., “Joint PME,” 65–71.  
69 Stephen M. Grenier, David Tucker and Christopher J.Lamb. United States Special Operations 
Forces (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008). 145-154 
70 Grenier et al., United States Special Operations Forces. 184-236. 
71 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 240–257. 
72 Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, 240–257. 
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this academic position, existing PME policies pragmatically caution against investing too 
heavily in one warfare area versus another, such as irregular warfare versus conventional 
combat.73 Since special operators advertise advanced skills and unconventional 
capabilities, then development should include specific yet currently undefined advanced 
preparation. How should NSW balance these specific development priorities? Regardless 
of how community balances irregular warfare and conventional combat skills, the 
discussion highlights the need to seek clarity in purpose regarding the NSW profession. 
Defining the special operation’s profession requires external and internal 
assessments. In 2004, an article in Military Review reproved SOCOM for not having 
adequate staff, planners, and leaders who were capable of functioning at the “Combatant 
Commander and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) echelon.”74 The article 
pointed to organizational shortfalls that affected U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.75 
Specifically, the authors pointed out, “SOF field grade officers receive no formal 
education to prepare them for Joint special operations at the operational level except that 
obtained in the intermediate service schools (ISS).”76 The key point was that the 
enterprise largely lacked preparation and skills required to lead large joint and combined 
special operations task forces.77 As a caution to future development efforts, the article 
suggests that it is negligent for SOF to “slight joint doctrine and education” because those 
skills are required to “combat terrorism.”78 The article posited that since special 
operations forces operate both unilaterally and in support of conventional forces, they 
must maintain a proficiency in conventional warfare. 
Although this article (Military Review) primarily focused on SOCOM, NSW was 
also cited as having development shortfalls for senior leaders.79 A 2014 article written by 
                                                 
73 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-2. 
74 Steven P. Schreiber, Greg E. Metzgar, and Stephen R. Mezhir, “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing 
the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer.” Military Review 84, no. 3 (2004): 2. 
75 Schreiber et al., “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer.” 2. 
76 Schreiber et al., “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer.” 3. 
77 Schreiber et al., “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer.” 3. 
78 Schreiber et al., “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer.” 6. 
79 Schreiber et al., “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer.” 7–8. 
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a SEAL officer updates this claim, stating that NSW “tends to neglect” SEAL leader 
preparation for the O-5 level “Operations Directorate.”80 Together these articles suggest 
that NSW requires community-specific development with an emphasis on deployment 
skills. Furthermore, there are no articles or essays claiming that current development 
programs produce fully adequate special operations commanders and staffs. 
6. Counterpoint: Supporting the Status Quo  
There are three principal opposing views to the assertion that NSW professional 
development requires improvement. First, is the “status quo” argument or the belief that 
success achieved by the NSW community provides reason to believe the process already 
works effectively. NSW members have successfully commanded thousands of combat 
operations and several NSW officers have already been promoted to very senior levels 
through the current system. Second, there are concerns that too much focused training 
will rob the community of its innovative problem-solving abilities, which stem from 
flexible career paths and broad experiences. The suggestion is that standardized 
development could alter the core identity and potentially negatively impact the 
effectiveness of the SEAL Teams. Finally, some NSW community members informally 
postulate that future special operations missions will not require higher echelon 
leadership.81 If individuals and small teams dominate the demand for future special 
operations, then investment in senior leaders remains an unnecessary distraction. These 
are concerns voiced by some members of an already overburdened community.  
Acknowledging the counterpoints, there are at least three reasons this research 
should continue. First, the SOCOM Commander’s current guidance states unequivocally 
that improving professional development is one of his top priorities.82 Second, the theory 
that non-standard and non-focused training will create better higher-level joint 
warfighters remains unsupported. As a community, NSW does not accept this logic for 
simpler skills such as physical fitness and weapons proficiency. Logic demands a 
                                                 
80 Matthew Peterson, “The Roles and Responsibilities of an Operations Directorate,” Ethos: Naval 
Special Warfare, Issue 25, 26. 
81 Informal discussion among members of the NSW community. 
82 U.S. Special Operations Command, Commander’s Special Operations Professional Education, 6. 
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deliberate process to consistently produce credible and qualified members in any 
established profession. Third, U.S. law and military policy make it likely that senior 
SEALs will participate in the running of future joint task forces due to the level of 
responsibility inherent to special operations mission command.83 
7. Application to Naval Special Warfare Development 
Aggregating the factors and recommendations discovered in this review reveals 















Figure 1.  Summary of Naval Special Warfare Professional Development Findings 
and Considerations. 
                                                 
83 Department of the Navy, “The Charge of Command” (white paper by the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations), 2011, 1-4. 
Summary:  
1. Since 1944, NSW deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces, and current military directives 
direct the community to maintain this capability (FRM S3500.3, 2013). 
2. DOD expects NSW to produce proficient joint warfighters. 
3. Recent research suggests that NSW’s professional development could be improved. 
4. SEALs benefit from numerous albeit ad hoc development opportunities and mandates. 
5. Effective development programs synchronize training, education, and experience. 
6. Development should be purposeful, career-long, and include the two levels-up concept. 
7. NSW should resist relying too heavily on past experiences or OJT.  
8. Specific NSW education must take precedence over general education. 
9. Formal education includes case study analysis, mentorship during war-gaming and terrain 
walks, and self-study of the NSW profession. 
10. NSW would benefit by including informal methods of what Huntington describes as 
corporate nature (mentorship, professional associations and journals, etc.). 
11. Any changes must protect the core characteristics and strengths of NSW. 
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8. Research Questions 
In light of the stakes involved and expanding roles of SOCOM and NSW leaders, 
it is appropriate to test the bottom-up approach.  This analysis raises three important 
questions about the profession. First, what are the echelon-specific knowledge 
requirements for the NSW profession? Second, does the current development system 
sufficiently prepare SEAL leaders to run larger-scale organizations and operations in 
these types of deployed environments? Third, have conditions and requirements changed 
sufficiently to warrant altering the current development strategy?  This review did not 
discover adequate answers to these research questions during the examination of previous 
research and existing professional development policies. Therefore, an opportunity exists 
to update NSW’s professional development strategy.  
This literature review supports the need for research that is designed to advance 
the NSW profession. Analytic rigor could inform how NSW should refine its 
development strategy to better balance competing requirements (i.e., conventional and 
irregular warfare, and maritime skills). To move forward, this research project makes two 
assumptions. First, SEALs will lead O-5 and O-6 task forces in the future and may be 
expected to rapidly fill these roles in future combat and contingency operations. Second, 
the NSW profession requires specific preparation, which includes a concentration in 
irregular warfare and maritime operations. To contribute to a better understanding of the 
profession, further research must gather more data on the following requirements (see 
Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Research Requirements Revealed through Literature Review. 
Research Requirements:  
1. Identify and prioritize key aspects of the NSW profession. 
2. Assess NSW’s current professional development system. 
3. Pursue recommendations for ways to improve senior leader preparation. 
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C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS PROJECT 
This research is constructed around a “systems approach” that is similar to the one 
described by Donovan.84 Although slightly different, the fundamental concept of 
planning backward from a desired outcome remains the same. The model is adapted from 
David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman organizational behavioral model (see Figure 
3).85 For those familiar with the original model, “skills/functions” take the place of 
tasks/requirements and “SEALs” takes the place of “people.” Essentially, the five-part 
model describes a transformation process, which produces desired outputs (qualified 
people) and outcomes (organizational capabilities).86 
The arrows in the octagon of Figure 3 indicate that an appropriate alignment of 
the individual (current training and experience), the skills and functional requirements, 
and the informal and formal development mechanisms should be driven by the goal of the 
system. In accordance with Figure 3, there are numerous factors that affect professional 
development system input, including availability of talent, resources, and career 
constraints to name a few. For brevity, this report will not delve into those aspects of the 
system. Instead, this project will focus on defining the skills/ joint functions required by 
senior SEAL leaders. 
                                                 
84 Nathan Leites, and Charles Wolf Jr. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 35. 
85 David A. Nadler, and Michael L. Tushman. “A model for diagnosing organizational behavior.” 
Organizational Dynamics 9, no. 2 (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Inc., 1980): 35–51. 
86 Nadler and Tushman, “A model for diagnosing organizational behavior,” 35–51. 
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Figure 3.  Systems Approach87 
Table 1 identifies how this research translated different parts of Figure 3 to the 
professional development “system” for NSW. The items listed under formal and informal 
are the current and possible mechanisms used for professional development. Before 
discussing this model further, a short discussion about the community is useful to put the 
model in context.  
Table 1.   Professional Development System – Example Interpretation. 























                                                 
87 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 35. 
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1. SEAL Teams and O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces 
For simplicity, this project focuses on the “traditional” SEAL teams while 
purposely excluding other facets of the community. As depicted in Figure 4, SEAL teams 
consist of a headquarters element, three troop or task unit (TU) headquarters, and seven 
SEAL platoons (21-man elements).88 Before deployment, SEAL team command and 
staffs are responsible for preparing the team for a wide range of special operations. On 
deployment, teams often form the core of task groups (NSWTGs) or task forces. Naming 
conventions vary by assignment but for the purposes of this research, task forces are 
defined as a battalion-level or above organization headed by at least a U.S. special 
operations lieutenant colonel or commander.89 As previously discussed, these 
organizations may cover large territories and include several thousand troops from 
diverse communities (military service, civilian organizations, and other nationalities). An 
example of a task force organizational chart is listed in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. Navy SEAL Team Task Organization Example.90 
                                                 
88 Department of the Navy, Naval Special Warfare (NWP 3–05) (Washington, DC:  Department of the 
Navy, 2013) 2:3. 
89 U. S. Special Operations Command, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations (Joint 
Publication 3.05.1) (MacDill, Air Force Base: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2011) III-7. 













Figure 5.  Naval Special Warfare Task Force Example.91 
2. SEAL Professional Development 
To simplify the presentation, this project will use the officer career path for 
illustration; however, enlisted, chief warrant officers, and officers each require careful 
individual analysis. The following three paragraphs will detail NSW’s current formal 
(institutional training, experience, education) and informal (self-study, mentorship, sense 
of community) professional development mechanisms. 
3. Formal Development  
For officers, assignments progress through approximately ten years of tours 
assigned to a SEAL team (Figure 6).92  In between these tours, officers spend time away 
from the SEAL teams to gain exposure to both operational and strategic issues. The 
desired outcome or apex of the officer profession (at least for the first 20-years) is 
selection as a SEAL team commanding officer. Likewise, senior enlisted and chief 
warrant officers hold key leadership and advisory positions on SEAL teams. 
                                                 
91 Department of the Navy, Naval Special Warfare, 3:6. 
92 Department of the Navy, Approved FY-15 Active-Duty Line Community Career Brief, 2014.     
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Figure 6.  Approved 2014 Naval Special Warfare Officer Career Path 
a. Tactical 
SEAL Team officer training can be divided into two categories: troop and below 
and task force level (see Figure 7). From initial qualification through the milestone 
billets, SEAL officers spend approximately eight years training at and below the troop 
level (individual, fire team, platoon, and troop).93 Team billets typically consist of two-
year tours that are comprised of eighteen months of training and six months of 
deployment. During each cycle, troops and platoons spend approximately six months 
completing individual skills training (shooting, parachuting, diving, etc.), six months 
participating in unit training (troop and below), and six months preparing to operate 
inside of a task force.94 Team operations officers, executive officers, and commanding 
officers often participate in tactical training and even execute command during field 
readiness exercises. However, there are no standardized training (academic, education, or 
                                                 
93 Department of the Navy, Naval Special Warfare, 4:3. 
94 Department of the Navy, Naval Special Warfare, 4:3. 
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focused mentorship) blocks designed to prepare task force level competencies (planning, 
running daily operations, commanding) in maritime special operations.95  
 
Figure 7.  Naval Special Warfare Officer Task Force Assignments. 
b. Academic 
SEAL officers progress through various stages of academic preparation 
(classroom education training) throughout their career. SEAL officer candidates attend a 
five-week Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC), which develops platoon-level 
capabilities as well as basic leadership skill development.96 Four years later, officers 
attend a five-week platoon leader’s course, which reinforces platoon-level leadership 
skills.97 Before becoming a team commander, officers typically attend two forms of 
intermediate education. First, prior to assuming command, officers must complete the 
first level of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).98 Second, officers often 
                                                 
95 Department of the Navy, Naval Special Warfare, 4:1-14. 
96 “Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land),” Department of the Navy, August 15, 2014, 
http://www.navy.com/careers/special-operations/seals.html. 
97 Common knowledge within the NSW community. 
98 “Joint Professional Military Education,” Department of the Navy, August 16, 2014, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/Bupers-NPC/Officer/Detailing/Jointofficer/Pages/JPME.aspx. 
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attend some type of graduate school, including options at several civilian institutions, 
service command and staff programs, and even various War Colleges (depending on 
seniority).99 
The Navy also requires all executive and commanding officers to attend two-
weeks of leadership training in Newport, Rhode Island, which reinforces basic leadership 
principles, Navy policies, and administrative regulations.100 Finally, SOCOM and NSW 
both require short pre-command courses, which educate commanders on special 
operations issues, initiatives, strategies, and lessons learned.101 
4. Informal Development 
NSW mandated mentorship occurs at least twice in an officer’s career. Before 
becoming a platoon commander, officers complete an assignment as an assistant officer-
in-charge, which allows junior SEAL officers to receive mentorship from both the senior 
non-commissioned officer and the platoon commander. As operations and executive 
officers, SEALs again receive mentorship from the commanding officer on how to 
administratively and operationally run a SEAL team. Additional mentorship often occurs 
while officers deploy forward augmenting staffs to gain experience in task force 
operations. 
5. Defining the Profession’s Required Skills and Functions  
As discussed in the literature review, the skills and functional requirements 
inherent to the NSW profession remain largely undefined, covering all aspects of military 
endeavors (conventional and irregular warfare, non-combat operations, maritime 
operations, etc). Additionally, there is a critical difference in the skills required to run a 
tactical platoon or managing single operations versus leading large organizations, which 
require campaign planning to achieve effects in operational and strategic realms. The 
                                                 
99 “Education Opportunity Opportunities for Officers,” Department of the Navy, August 16, 2014, 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/career/education/Pages/default.aspx.   
100 “Command Leadership School” Department of the Navy, August 16, 2014, 
http://www.netc.navy.mil/centers/cls/CO.aspx.  
101 “Joint Special Operations Forces Pre-Command Course,” U.S. SOCOM, August 16, 2014, 
https://jsou.socom.mil/ CourseInformation.aspx.  
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purpose of this research is to gather data to better understand the more operational and 
strategic leadership skills, how to prioritize those requirements and the implications to the 
development of NSW personnel for joint task force leadership roles. 
This project asserts that definition and prioritization are possible if the feedback 
loop between desired outcomes and professional development exists (see Figure 3). This 
project used joint and NSW doctrine as a starting point and solicited input from the NSW 
community to validate and prioritize broad doctrinal guidance applicable to professional 
development. To achieve this goal, a survey was designed around the seven warfighting 
or joint functions (SWFs), which are discussed in Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-
0) and Unified Land Operations (Army Doctrine Publication 3-0). These “elements of 
combat power” remain integral to all military operations regardless of echelon, task, or 
type of warfare.102 They describe basic military capabilities such as leadership, command 
and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and 
sustainment (see Table 2).103   
Table 2.   The Seven Warfighting Functions.104  




Command and Control 




6. Defining the Desired Outcome 
The final aspect of the framework involves anchoring the desired outputs and 
outcomes to a professional milestone. The outputs or goals for each SEAL involve the 
                                                 
102 Department of Defense, Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3–0) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2011), III 1–35. 
103 Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations (Army Doctrine Publication 3–0) (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Army, 2011), IV. 
104 Department of Defense, Joint Operations, III 1–35. 
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development of individuals prepared with a common knowledge and community-specific 
language. These leaders must be equipped with enhanced capability to mentor junior 
community members. Key staff and support members also require enhanced planning, 
staffing, and subject matter expertise. According to policies reviewed, the desired 
outcomes should be a community of professional joint warfighters who are also sub-
specialists in special operations, maritime operations, and irregular warfare. In 
accordance with standard career timelines, this project focuses on the first twenty-five 
years of SEAL officer, chief warrant officer, and enlisted career paths. Therefore, the 
requirements discussed in this study are specific to deployed task forces at the O-5 and 
O-6 echelon.105 Designating the desired output as staff, planners, advisors, and leaders for 
this echelon allows productive analysis of the pipeline.  
7. Research Parameters 
 
 
Figure 8.  Summary of Research Parameters. 
                                                 
105 “Secretary of the Navy Approved FY-15 Active-Duty Line Community Career Brief,” Department 
of the Navy, August 20, 2014, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/boards/activedutyofficer/CommunityBriefs.aspx.     
Research Parameters:  
1. Emphasize practical skills required for deployment. 
2. Use a systems approach.  
3. Designate the desired outcome: leaders & staff prepared for the O-5 and O-6 
echelon. 
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II. SURVEY METHOD 
A. APPROVAL, RECRUITMENT, AND RESPONSE 
The approvals, recruitment, and survey questions are detailed in three documents. 
The survey supporting this study (see Appendix D) was approved by the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protection of Human 
Subjects (see Appendix E). The Commander of the Center for SEAL and SWCC also 
approved the survey for release to the NSW community (part of Appendix E). In 
accordance with IRB guidelines, recruitment for this survey was completed via two 
emails (see Appendix F).  
The survey invitation was made in the following manner. The author obtained the 
participants’ contact information via NSW’s email distribution lists. An initial email was 
sent to 429 community members, requesting their participation in the online survey (see 
section C. below). Then after one week, a reminder email was sent to the same 
individuals. In addition to the emailed invitations, the author called numerous senior 
community leaders to help advertise; however, community leadership did not participate 
in official recruitment activities.  
Survey responses were collected in the following manner. The survey remained 
open for two weeks (August 18, 2014–September 01, 2014). Seventy-nine SEALs 
participated, which translates to an 18 percent response rate for the survey (see Table 
3).106  Participants invested significantly in this project as evidenced by both the quality 
and consistency in responses. They spent an average of 37 minutes completing the 33 
question online survey. Furthermore, they collectively wrote over 10 pages of single-
spaced feedback (5962 words) in response to the qualitative questions.  
                                                 
106 Sixteen responses were either incomplete or had inconsistent data. For example, several of those 
responses exhibited a combination of impossibly high data in certain sections, and contradictory ratings 
with no variation in the other sections (i.e., selecting only the lowest answers). Even if a participant 
strongly disagreed with this survey’s approach, then intellectually consistent responses would still 
demonstrate some variation based on the questions in the survey. Those sixteen responses were excluded 
from analysis, leaving seventy-nine usable responses. 
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B. SOFTWARE (LIME SURVEY) 
Naval Postgraduate School officials mandated the software used to construct this 
survey. The author was provided an account for the school’s Lime Survey program. Each 
question in the survey was modified from existing templates provided by the program.  
C. PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS (QUESTIONS 2–4) 
The demographics section collected information pertaining to the rank, 
deployment experience specific to O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces, and JPME 
qualifications of participants. Participants were senior SEALs (see Table 3) who served 
in key positions assigned to deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces. They included 
former members of command teams and operations teams (see Table 4). The data 
suggests that these were highly experienced SEALs in terms of number of deployments 
in key leadership positions at this echelon. With the exception of O-4s, survey 
respondents deployed twice in key positions at this echelon (see Table 5). 
Table 3.   Demographics of Survey Participants (Rank – Question 2).107  






E-9 12 15 137 
CWO-4, & 5 11 14 22 
O-4 29 37 109 
O-5 21 26 99 
O-6 or above 6 8 62 
Total 79 100 429 
 
Approximately 18% of SEALs holding the rank and experience sought by 




                                                 
107 Total population came from a 2014 community-manning snapshot provided by the NSW detailer. 
The population experiences minor but constant changes in number due to retirements and promotions. 
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Table 4.   Key Assignments for O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces. 
Key Assignments 
Tactical Elements (troop and below leaders) 
 
Operations Team: 
 - Operations Chief Warrant Officers 
 - Operations Senior Enlisted Advisors 
 - Operations Officers 
 
Command Team: 
 - Executive Officers 
 - Command Warrant Officers 
 - Command Senior Enlisted Advisors 
 - Deputy Commanders 
 - Commanders 
 
Table 5.   Demographics of Survey Participants (Deployments – 
Question 3).108  




Mean # (Std 
Dev) of 
Deployments by 
E-9 Respondents  









Mean # (Std 
Dev)  of 
Deployments 
by O-5  
Respondents  
Mean # (Std 
Dev) of 
Deployments 










N/A 1.4 (1.0) N/A N/A N/A 
Operations 
Officer N/A 0.7 (1.4) 1.4 (1.0) 1.5 (1.2) 1.3 (1.6) 
Executive 
Officer N/A N/A 0.3 (0.7) 0.5 (0.6) 0.2 (0.4) 
Command Chief 




1.5 (2.8) 0.1 (0.3) N/A N/A N/A 
Deputy 
Commander N/A 0.5 (1.4) 0.1 (0.3) 0.3 (0.5) 1.0 (1.2) 
Commander N/A N/A 0.1 (0.6) 1.0 (1.8) 0.7 (0.7) 
 
Mean # of reported deployments in key assignments (highlighted in red) is approximately 2.0, indicating this 
group is experienced at running O-5 and O-6 echelon Task Forces. 
 
 
                                                 
108 Summary of the results from Survey Questions 3 (Subject Deployment Experience). 
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As shown in Table 6, at least 25 percent reported at least some level of JPME 
qualification training.  Of note, 75 percent of the CWO participants reported that they had 
not attended any JPME training. 



















E-9 27 73 N/A N/A 
CWO 75 13 12 N/A 
O-4 54 N/A 46 0 
O-5 10 N/A 67 23 
O-6 or above 17 N/A 50 33 
 




D. SURVEY DESIGN 
The survey captured participants’ views about SEAL professional development, 
specifically focusing on staffing, planning, and leadership requirements associated with 
O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces. Additionally, all of the survey’s questions were posed 
in the context of preparing to run or staff deployed O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces. The 
demographics section (questions 1–9) was constructed to quantify participant experience 
and time spent (in months) preparing for leadership roles at this level.   
Following the demographics question, the survey was divided into three sections: 
prioritization of aspects of the profession (questions 10–25), assessment of current 
professional development (questions 26–29), and way ahead (questions 30–33). In the 
first section, participants prioritized skills, topics, and capabilities associated with each of 
the joint warfighting functions (JWFs) derived from doctrine. Questions were designed to 
help define what a task force leadership role encompasses by using military doctrine. To 
further define these functions, 111 sub-categories were added by analyzing joint special 
 31
operation and naval special warfare publications (Joint Publication 3-05 and NSW 
Publication 3-05). An example question is listed in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Sample Warfighting Function (Survey Question 10). 
The next section of the survey asked participants to assess how well the current 
SEAL system prepares the community in the JWFs. General assessments were requested 
as well as by individual position or assignment, which helps confirm timing of 
development requirements. The assessment section concluded by asking participants to 
identify the most essential aspect of their personal preparatory experiences from a list or 
to elaborate by commenting on what aided their personal development. A sample of 
assessment questions is presented in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10.  Sample Assessment (Survey Question 26). 
Finally, the Way Ahead section (see Figure 11) was designed to collect the 
community’s recommendations and priorities improving SEAL development. The final 
question was qualitative, collecting feedback from a comment box so that participants 




Figure 11.  Sample Way Ahead (Survey Question 32). 
E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
This report used IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
software to calculate basic descriptive statistics, which included means, standard 
deviation (Std Dev), and frequency of all response choices for each question. The mean 
captures the average value by adding all of the values for each question and then dividing 
the total number of participants.109 Standard deviation identifies the amount of variation 
within the mean listed for each question.110 High standard deviations indicate high 
variation in responses while low variation indicates constancy among participants. 
                                                 
109 Seymour Lipschutz and John J. Schiller. Schaum’s Outline Introduction to Probability and 
Statistics (New York NY: McGraw Hill, 2012), 5. 
110 Lipschutz and Schiller, Schaum’s Outline Introduction to Probability and Statistics, 7. 
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Therefore, lower variation or standard deviation values suggest stronger agreement across 
participants. In order to compare the ratings of importance of the topics under the seven 
war fighting functions, several t-test comparisons of means were conducted to determine 
a “rule of thumb.”  Based on these analyses, it was determined that if two means differ by 
0.3 or more, that difference is statistically significant (p<.05).  However, if two means 
differ by less than 0.3, that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should 
be treated as equal in importance. 
F. DATA INTERPRETATION 
Before diving into the results, it is important to review how the results were 
derived. The prioritization of doctrine, assessment, and way ahead sections used a 6-point 
scale with 1 representing the lowest rating on preparedness, importance, or priority and 6 
representing the highest rating. Only the two anchor points or the labels of the end-points 
of the rating scale (i.e., 1 and 6) were identified to assure equal intervals between the 
rating options. Given the 1 to 6 range in ratings, a mean rating on a question of 3.5 would 
represent the mid-point on the rating scale. Low numbers indicate negative responses and 
high numbers indicate positive responses. As depicted in the survey key (Table 7), if 
participants assessed the system with a rating of 5 or 6 it would indicate a well-prepared 
team. One final note, the results are presented in the following format: status of 
community preparedness (why), joint warfighting functions (what), individual 
assignments (who and when), and moving forward (how). Questions that ask about who 
and when refer to the NSW assignments listed in Table 4 (O-5 and O-6 echelon Task 
Force assignments). 




III. SURVEY RESULTS 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT - WHY (QUESTIONS 5–9, 28) 
This section was designed as an assessment of the current development system by 
asking participants to answer the following question: “How well was (were) your Team 
(s) prepared for running a task force?”  The survey produced a rating for professional 
development specific to this echelon of deployed leadership. The data from the survey 
strongly suggest a need to improve preparations for O-5 and O-6 echelon task force 
roles.111  This claim is supported by two sets of statistical evidence, involving both an 
assessment and an indication of total time spent in preparation for this echelon.  
The rating scale for this question was 1 (insufficiently prepared) to 6 (well-
prepared). The mean rating for this question was slightly above the midpoint (3.5) for 
both Operations and Command Teams, which are interpreted as marginal ratings (see 
Table 8). However, a significant number of participants (about a third for both categories) 
gave ratings below the midpoint; these are interpreted to reflect “inadequate” preparation 
(see Table 9).112  Additionally, approximately 30 percent of participants rated preparation 
for both Operations and Command Teams as 4s, which were also interpreted as marginal 
preparation for those assignments.   
For Operations Teams, 36 percent of participants rated preparation as 
inadequate (three or less) and an additional 30 percent gave a marginal 
(four) rating (see Table 9). 
 
For Command Teams, 29 percent of participants rated preparation as 
inadequate (three or less) and an additional 29 percent gave a marginal 
(four) rating (see Table 9). 
 
 
                                                 
111 Although twelve participants skipped question 28, the participants still provided clear feedback in 
the self-assessment section. 




Table 8.   NSW’s Assessment of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 Level 
(Mean Ratings – Question 28) 
Questions 28: NSW Self-Assessment 
of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 
echelon 
Participants’ Mean 
Rating (Std Dev), 
Scale 1-6,  
(6 = Highest Rating) 
Operations Team 3.9 (1.2) 
Command Team 4.0 (1.3) 
Survey participants assessed NSW preparation for deployed 
O-5 and O-6 echelon assignments as marginal. 
 
Table 9.   NSW’s Assessment of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 Level 
(Response Frequency on a 1 to 6 Scale – Question 28) 
NSW Self-Assessment of Preparation for 
O-5 and O-6 echelon 
Assessment: Frequency of Response 
(%) on Scale 1-6, (6 = Highest Rating)  
1          2           3          4           5          6 
Operations Team 4         8         24         30         26         8   
Command Team 6         8         15         29         33         9   
 
A substantial number of survey participants assessed NSW preparation for deployed 
O-5 and O-6 echelon assignments as inadequate. 
 
 
A second set of questions gives additional support for why more attention to 
preparation is needed, suggesting that participants received minimal preparation specific 
to this echelon. Respondents were asked to specify the number of months spent in 
activities specific to preparation for their O-5 and O-6 echelon Operations Team 
assignments (see Table 10).113  A large number of respondents in each category reported 
zero months of preparation specific to this echelon (at least 36 percent as seen in the Field 
Exercises result in Table 10). Substantially higher percentages report zero preparation 
from other sources (see Table 10). For example, 77 percent reported attending zero 
months of Staff of Planning Schools prior to their first Operations Team assignment. 
Forty-eight percent reported zero months of Training or School prior to their first 
                                                 
113 Summary of the results from Survey Questions 5–8. 
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Command Team assignment (see Table 11). The average time participants reported in 
preparation for this echelon prior to their first assignment is listed in Tables 10 and 11. 
Table 10.   Preparation of O-5 and O-6 Operations Team (J3 or N3 – 
Questions 5–8) 





Staff or Planning Schools 0.3 (0.7) 77 
Command Post Exercises 0.6 (1.3) 69 
Field Exercises 1.4 (2.1) 36 
Deployment Augments 1.7 (3.4) 67 
 
Participants received little preparation for O-5 and O-6 echelon 
Operations Team Assignments 
 
 
Table 11.   Preparation of O-5 and O-6 Level Command Team (School – 
Question 9) 





Training / School to prepare you 
for a Command Team position on 
an O-5 or O-6 echelon Task Force 
0.9 (1.7) 48% 
 
Participants received little preparation (Training / School) for O-5 and 
O-6 echelon Command Team Assignments 
 
 
B. SKILLS REQUIRED - WHAT (QUESTIONS 10–25, 26, 30) 
This research was designed to answer the following question: “What are the 
practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and are those competencies being 
developed into NSW’s future leaders?”  The study produced a list of potential areas for 
professional development in the warfighting functions (see Table 12) and sub-aspects 
(see Appendix A). The goal for this section of the survey was to solicit survey participant 
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input to better define those skills by identifying development priorities. Although the list 
may incompletely answer this question, this survey confirmed that the seven warfighting 
functions (SWFs see Table 13) are highly important for running O-5 and O-6 echelon 
task forces.114  
Table 12.   The Seven Warfighting Functions.115  




Command and Control 




The data support this interpretation in two ways. First, all SWFs had means of 4.6 
or above (out of a maximum rating of 6) in terms of how the survey participants rated the 
importance of that area of expertise (see the first column in Table 13).116   Second, 
participants were also asked to respond to the following statement: “SEALs should be 
formally developed in the SWFs.”117 Again participants rated all seven functions highly 
with means at or above a 4.8 (see the third column in Table 13).118    Collectively, these 
findings reveal simply that of all the SWFs are perceived by the community to be 
important to the preparation of O-5 and O-6 echelon Task Force leadership. Of note, the 
Leadership and Intelligence categories were ranked highest in both sections (see Table 




                                                 
114 Department of Defense, Joint Operations, III 1–35. 
115 Department of Defense, Joint Operations, III 1–35. 
116 Summary of the results from Survey questions 10–25. 
117 Summary of the results from Survey Question 30. 
118 Summary of the results from Survey Question 30. 
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Table 13.   Ranking of the Functions for O-5 & O-6 Task Force 















Leadership 5.1 (0.5) 4.0 (1.5) 5.6 (1.0) 
Intelligence  5.1 (0.7) 3.2 (1.4) 5.2 (1.1) 
Fires 5.1 (0.9) 3.4 (1.4) 5.1 (1.1) 
Command and Control  4.8 (0.6) 3.9 (1.4) 5.6 (0.9) 
Movement and Maneuver 4.8 (0.8) 4.2 (1.5) 5.2 (1.1) 
Sustainment  4.6 (0.9) 3.1 (1.3) 5.0 (1.0) 
Protection 4.6 (0.8) 3.5 (1.4) 4.8 (1.1) 
 
- Importance ranked highly 
- NSW’s self-assessment was significantly lower—needs improvement 
- Participants strongly recommended investing in all SWFs 
 
 
The survey included a list of 111 sub-aspects of the SWFs, which were ranked by 
means (complete list is in Appendix A). As previously discussed (in Chapter II, Section 
E), it was determined that if two means differ by 0.3 or more, that difference is 
statistically significant (p<.05).  However, if two means differ by less than 0.3, that 
difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should be treated as equal in 
importance. To summarize, the first 91 sub-aspects were rated above a 4.5, indicating that 
survey participants considered them to be highly important skills for the O-5 and O-6 
echelon (according to Table 7). Numbers 92 through 111 were still rated above the mid-
point (3.5), falling in the important category. For illustrative purposes, the top ten sub-
aspects are listed below in Table 14.  Six of the top ten require classified training venues 
due to their association to classified programs (e.g., ISR integration and Employment 





Table 14.   Sample from NSW’s Professional Development Priorities List 
(full list in Appendix A)  
  
2014 NSW Professional Development 









1 ISR Integration and Employment Systems  
Movement and 
Maneuver  5.68 0.5
2 Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-making Leadership 5.68 0.6
3 
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate 
(F3EAD) Targeting  Intelligence 5.62 0.7
4 ISR Employment and Integration  Intelligence 5.58 0.8
5 
Battle Staff or JOC Procedures (i.e., Practical 
Application of C2 during Mission Execution) Movement Maneuver 5.55 0.9
6 
Practical Application of Fires Approvals and 
Employment Fires 5.52 0.9
7 
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty 
Evacuation (CASEVAC)  Protection  5.52 0.9
8 Authorities and Approvals Leadership 5.51 0.8
9 Intelligence Agencies (NSA, CIA, DIA)  
Command and 
Control 5.48 0.8
10 Irregular Warfare (Population Centric) Leadership 5.47 0.9
 
Despite high ratings (all above 4.6) in perceived importance, participants gave 
lower marks when asked if the current pipeline sufficiently prepares SEALs in the SWFs 
as related to O-5 and O-6 Task Force echelon leadership (see Table 13). As shown in the 
“Assessment Rating” column of Table 13, three of the functions had responses that 
suggest inadequate preparation (rated below the rating scale midpoint of 3.5) and the 
others hover near a 4.0 rating.119 Additionally, fairly large percentages (28 percent or 
more as in Movement and Maneuver) of participants graded the current system poorly (3 
or less) in terms of the adequacy of preparation in all of the SWFs (see Table 15). In 
contrast, over 61 percent of survey participants that ranked all SWFs at a 5 or higher in 
priority for future investment indicating strong agreement with this statement (as seen in 
the Protection row of Table 15). A complete list of response frequencies for Questions 26 
and 30 is located in Appendix B. 
                                                 
119 Summary of the results from Survey Question 26. 
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Table 15.   Assessment versus Recommendations (Interpretation of Data 
from Questions 26 and 30).  
Preparation Event Assessed:  
% Rating a 3 or Less 
(Insufficiently prepared)
Way Ahead:  
% Rating a 5 or More 
(Priorities for preparation) 
Command and Control  32 94 
Leadership  32 92 
Movement and Maneuver  28 81 
Intelligence 58 81 
Fires 47 74 
Sustainment 57 71 
Protection 47 61 
 
High consensus in low assessment numbers versus high priority recommendations for new 
investment in the Seven Warfighting Functions. 
 
 
This survey also examined whether conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and a 
detailed set of specific maritime operations are important preparations for NSW O-5 and 
O-6 echelon Task Force leaders.120 The data reveal statistically significant preference 
ordering using a t-test comparison of means.   As shown in Table 16, participants gave 
irregular warfare (mean = 5.5) a significantly (p<.05) higher rating than conventional 
warfare (mean = 4.8).121  Participants rated the importance of nine sub-aspects of 
maritime operations. While all nine aspects have means above 4.0 (on a six-point scale of 
importance), three aspects had ratings that were significantly (p<.05) lower than the 





                                                 
120 Summary of the results from Survey Question 10, and 21. 
121 As previously discussed in Chapter II, Section E, it was determined that if two means differ by 0.3 
or more, that difference is statistically significant (p<.05).  However, if two means differ by less than 0.3, 
that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings should be treated as equal in importance. 
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Table 16.   Conventional and Irregular Warfare, and Maritime Operations 
(Questions 10 and 21). 
Preparation Event Mean (Std Dev) 
Conventional Warfare (Enemy Centric) 4.8 (1.3) 
Irregular Warfare (Population Centric) 5.5 (0.9) 
Maritime Operations (Question 21)  
Sea Basing Command and Control  5.0 (2.0) 
Amphibious Operations - Littoral  4.8 (1.2) 
Special Boat Integration  4.8 (1.1) 
Maritime Interception Operations  4.8 (1.1) 
NSW Riverine Operations  4.3 (1.1) 
Integration with Navy Surface Ships 4.9 (1.2) 
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Integration (SDV) 4.2 (1.4) 
NSW Submarine Operations  4.0 (1.4) 
Air over Water Operations  4.7 (1.2) 
 
- Irregular warfare valued highest; however, conventional warfare 
and maritime operations were also highly valued.  
 
 
C. STATUS SPECIFIC TO NSW ASSIGNMENTS - WHO AND WHEN 
(QUESTIONS 27, 31) 
This section examines individual preparation in the SWFs specific to the nine 
assignments listed in Table 17. To achieve this, the survey took a two-step approach. 
First, respondents assessed how well the community prepares the nine personnel 
categories in the SWFs.122  Five of the nine roles were identified as receiving inadequate 
preparation (below 3.5) and the others remain near a 4.0 rating (Table 17). Forty-nine 
percent or more of the participants assessed the current development system at or below a 
4 rating (Table 17). In contrast, greater than 55 percent of participants rated all of the 
positions as being a high (5 or more) priority for investment need for professional 
development in the SWFs (Table 18). However, even the highest rated assignments still 
fell below the desired level of a 4.5 or higher (see Table 17).   Therefore, all SEALs 
require formal development in the Seven Warfighting Functions prior to their first 
                                                 
122 Summary of the results from Survey Question 27. 
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assignment on an O-5 or O-6 echelon Task Force.  A complete list of response 
frequencies for Questions 27 and 31 is located in Appendix B. 
Table 17.   Assessment of Adequacy of Preparation for Individual 
Positions (Interpretation of Question 27) 
Personnel Assignments Mean Rating (Std Dev) for Adequacy of Preparation 
Assessment % 
Rating of 4 or Less 
(Marginally 
Prepared) 
Tactical Elements (Troop and Below) 4.3 (1.5) 49 
Commanders 4.0 (1.3) 54 
Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs) 3.7 (1.4) 64 
Deputy Commanders 3.7 (1.4) 66 
Operations SEAs 3.4 (1.4) 78 
Operations Officers 3.3 (1.3) 82 
Executive Officers 3.3 (1.3) 77 
Operations Warrant Officers 2.8 (1.3) 93 
Command Warrant Officers 2.5 (1.3) 92 
 




Second, it asked respondents to prioritize future investment by assignment.123 The 
key finding is that all of the positions were rated as high priority (4.5 or higher). 
Interestingly, in Table 18 commanders and operations officers had the highest ratings 






                                                 
123 Summary of the results from Survey Question 31. 
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Table 18.   Way Ahead—Identifying Priorities for Future Preparation 
(Interpretation of Question 31) 
Personnel Assignments Mean Rating (Std Dev) for Priority of Future Preparation 
Way Ahead % 
Rating of 5 or More 
(Highest Priority) 
Tactical Elements (Troop and Below) 5.2 (1.2) 76 
Commanders 5.7 (0.9) 93 
Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs) 5.5 (1.0) 87 
Deputy Commanders 5.4 (1.0) 86 
Operations SEAs 5.3 (0.9) 91 
Operations Officers 5.6 (0.8) 95 
Executive Officers 5.2 (1.0) 81 
Operations Warrant Officers 4.7 (1.3) 70 
Command Warrant Officers 4.5 (1.5) 55 
 




D. MOVING FORWARD – HOW (QUESTIONS 29, AND 31–32) 
This survey used three methods to consolidate the survey’s recommendations for 
developing future O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leaders. First, the survey asked 
participants to identify the most essential element of their own personal preparation.124  
Participants chose from a list of possible answers (Table 19). The results of the survey 
clearly demonstrate that the community values “on-the-job training (deployments)” as the 






                                                 
124 Summary of the results from Survey Question 29. 
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Table 19.   Most Essential Element of Preparation for O-5 and O-6 Task 
Force Echelon Roles (Question 29). 
Most Essential Element of Preparation (Method) Response Percentages  
Military Command and Staff College 4 
Joint Professional Military Education 4 
Staff and Planning Schools  3 
Participation in Joint Exercises 10 
On the Job Training (Deployments) 58 
Self Study 5 




NSW values OJT the most out of several development options 
 
 
However, participants also indicated that a new program is required to prepare the 
community for O-5 and O-6 echelon assignments. Participants prioritized the following 
development approaches for future investments (Table 20).125  As the results indicate, all 
of the mechanisms for professional development are seen as important. However, the data 
strongly suggest that the community would benefit from new investment designed to 
produce O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leaders (as seen in the “New Education and 








                                                 
125 Summary of the results from Survey Question 32. 
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Table 20.   Prioritizing Future Investment for Task Force Leaders 
(Question 32). 
Usefulness of Preparation Method Way Ahead Rating Mean (Std Dev)  
New Education and Training to produce Joint Task Force Leaders 5.5 (1.1) 
More participation in existing JPME 4.7 (1.3) 
More participation in Joint Exercises 4.4 (1.4) 
More participation in existing Staff and Planning Schools 4.0 (1.5) 
More deployments  3.9 (1.5) 
More Self Study 3.7 (1.4) 
 
Participants valued all preparation methods; however, the highest recommendation method 




1. Qualitative Findings: Most Essential Sources of Preparation 
On-the-job training or experience remains critical to preparation for the O-5 and 
O-6 echelon. The third source of data about ways to move forward in improving 
professional development for NSW leaders came from qualitative comments.126 Forty 
people (51 percent of respondents) provided qualitative responses to the following 
question: “If you felt sufficiently prepared for your role at the O-5 and O-6 echelon, then 
identify the most essential element of your personal preparation.”127 To summarize the 
four pages (12-point font and single spaced), responses were grouped in four categories 
(see Figure 12). The summary box below lists the key themes that emerged from analysis 
of the comments in order of frequency of mention.  [Note:  participants often included 
several themes in their responses so the total number of comments by theme is greater 
than 40.]  A detailed presentation of the qualitative analysis, it is listed in Appendix C. 
                                                 
126 This section summarizes the qualitative comments from Questions 29 and 33. 
127 This section summarizes the qualitative comments from Question 29. 
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Figure 12.  Summary of Qualitative Findings: Most Essential Sources of Preparation 
2. Way Ahead—Qualitative Recommendations  
Thirty-three people (42 percent of respondents) provided qualitative responses to 
the final question, which asked for recommendations on how to improve NSW’s 
professional development.128 To summarize the 10 pages (12 point font and single 
spaced), responses were grouped in two categories (supportive and cautionary). The 
summary box below lists the responses in order of their frequency (Figure 13). As with 
the qualitative question analyzed above, participants often covered several topics in their 
responses to this question so the total of thematic comments is greater than 33. 
                                                 
128 This section summarizes the qualitative comments from Question 33. 
Qualitative Summary from Question 29:  
 - If you felt sufficiently prepared for your role at the O-5 and O-6 echelon 
then identify or comment on what was the most essential element of your personal 
preparation: 
Twenty comments identified on-the job training or personal experience 
1. Nine comments identified Joint Exercises  
2. Four comments identified Joint Professional Military Education 
3. Twenty comments stated that NSW should improve professional development. 
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Figure 13.  Summary of Qualitative Recommendations: How Should the 
Community Prepare Leaders? 
Qualitative Summary from Question 33:  
 - Asked for recommendations on how to improve NSW’s professional 
development. 
1. Thirty-six Supportive Comments: 
a. Twenty-seven calls for creating and / or improving existing NSW PRODEV—
specifically for O-5 and O-6 echelon leaders. 
b. Nine novel recommendations, including micro-education, Interagency (training 
and collaboration), logistics training, war-gaming, more joint exercises, looking at 
other services professional development pipelines, and suggestions for re-
analyzing NSW task organization.  
2. Eleven cautionary mentions or suggestions that fell outside that provided by military 
channels. 
a. Eight explicitly recommended the use of civilian sources for professional 
development. 
b. Three cautioned against spending too much time off the battlefield.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. PROJECT FINDINGS 
This project answered the following questions: First, what are the practical skills 
required to be a SEAL leader today?  Second, are these competencies being developed 
into NSW’s future leaders?  To explore this topic, this project used two Research 
Questions. The first was whether NSW leaders receive adequate development (training, 
education, and experience) specifically focused on preparing them for higher-echelon 
leadership roles. The second question examined what specific capabilities NSW’s leaders 
require (e.g., irregular warfare, maritime operations). To examine these questions, 
historical, military doctrine, current policy, and academic contributions were reviewed 
and used as the foundation for the study. Survey feedback revealed consensus regarding 
the desire to enhance development through institutional courses designed to prepare 
SEALs for senior assignments. Additionally, the data helps to better define the NSW 
profession by identifying and prioritizing the skills required for those assignments. 
Finally, combining qualitative and quantitative analysis revealed five findings, used to 
derive three recommendations for improving NSW’s professional development pipeline. 
There are five key findings from this project. First, both history and current 
military directives compel NSW to make preparation for O-5 and O-6 echelon task force 
assignments an imperative element of development. Second, NSW overly relies on “on-
the-job” training to grow key staff, planners, and leaders. This is a liability if 
opportunities for sustained deployments decrease as per the draw-down in Iraq and 
Afghanistan while simultaneously the community is still expected to surge expert 
capabilities in support of contingency operations (SOCFWDs, etc.). Third, there are 
specific skills and knowledge requirements associated with each echelon of deployed 
NSW commands. This research produced a starting point, or an extrapolation of NSW’s 
2014 professional development priorities, as related to this echelon (Appendix A). 
Highlights for this list include placing emphasis on and developing proficiency in running 
O-5 and O-6 task forces, the seven warfighting functions, irregular and conventional 
warfare, and maritime operations. Tangentially, the feedback also confirmed the 
 50
limitations of general education, JPME, and even current institutional professional 
development. Fourth, the community strongly recommends improving professional 
development to better develop senior joint warfighters. Finally, sufficient development 
must be completed prior to the first assignment in a key role at this echelon (typically on 
an operations team). A summary of this project’s findings are listed in Figure 14.   
 
Figure 14.  Summary of Project Findings  
B. PROOF OF CONCEPT: SURVEY-BASED DATA TO INFORM 
DECISION MAKING 
Perhaps, the most significant finding in this project is confirmation that an 
evidence-based approach enables the isolation and exploitation of data which can inform 
decisions. Moreover, this project demonstrates a powerful, highly useful, and cost 
effective proof-of-concept (survey-based data to inform decision making). It is possible 
to solve problems and inform decision makers using existing people, resources, and 
proven techniques. Naval Postgraduate School students, faculty, research assistants, and 
technology remain available for support to the NSW community. Similar processes are 
already used by NSW to inform decision makers about organizational readiness (Defense 
Readiness Reporting System—Navy). Additionally, several top corporations like Google 
Project Findings (for O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces):  
1. History & military directives compel NSW to prepare for these assignments. 
2. NSW relies too heavily on on-the-job training or personal experience, which is a liability. 
3. Specific skills are required for each echelon - a starting point is identified by this research in 
Appendix A. 
4. NSW community strongly recommends improving professional development to better 
develop senior Joint Warfighters. 
5. Sufficient development must be completed prior to the first key assignment at this echelon. 
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are investing heavily in survey technology to exploit and empower the collective 
intelligence of their people.129  
By keeping the project inside NSW, the community benefits from members still 
personally invested in the community. They bring recent experience and context to each 
project. Additionally, the period of study allotted at NPS (18 months) allows for 
significant background research, which when combined with qualitative and quantitative 
survey data produces powerfully informed recommendations. Moving forward, this 
author recommends that NSW capitalize on this invaluable opportunity immediately by 
formally engaging with students and faculty to capitalize on the intellectual capacity in 
the Defense Analysis program.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This project concludes with three recommendations. The objective to prepare 
senior leaders for task force roles must be broadcast to the NSW community. Designating 
the end state allows the community to improve professional development purposefully 
and adapt to future preparation requirements.  Use of these findings to organize 
supporting research will be necessary to identify means to efficiently achieve the desired 
outcome. NSW must continue using the methodology in this report which involved a 
thorough literature and historical review and a system based approach to analyzing 
professional development. Further, NSW could spread responsibility for development as 
appropriate between the system’s transformation processes (as depicted in Figure 1, 
Formal and Informal venues). For example, certain skills could be developed through 
self-study, other skills through mentorship, and still other in formal courses. The point is 
to synchronize efforts to achieve purposeful development. By organizing in this manner 
and clarifying the purpose of professional development, NSW will avoid haphazard 
efforts.  
For this to work and remain viable requires the second recommendation: 
Feedback must be institutionalized. Key elements of this feedback should include an 
assessment, prioritization of required skills or functions of the profession, and a section 
                                                 
129 Author attended a conference on this subject at Google in Mountain View on October 2, 2014. 
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that collects recommendations for improvements. Doing this will allow the community to 
differentiate between adequacy and excellence as done with physical fitness and shooting 
skills. Leading special operations organizations should require similar scrutiny and 
evaluation. To achieve this level of professionalism, a formal and active method for 
collecting, analyzing, and archiving community feedback is required. Organizations like 
Google survey their people continuously, sometimes as often as every six months. Their 
people participate because the organization responds accordingly. NSW’s challenge will 
be participation; however, if the community made it a mandatory turnover item for 
leaders leaving key positions then the community could capture and consume their 
feedback. Adaptability remains a key strength of NSW so this approach will ensure that 
the community remains on the cutting edge of innovation. 
Finally, enhancing professional development with increased focus on senior joint 
warfighting skills is necessary but not sufficient enough for continued success. While the 
skills identified by this report (see Appendix A) should be considered core NSW 
competencies, other things are also needed. For example, there are many valuable 
opportunities available in the civilian / corporate sectors for leadership development, 
which may offer perspectives unavailable from a purely military education. Therefore, 
this project absolutely supports civilian education and corporate interactions, which 
broaden our leader’s strategic perspectives. The key is to not prioritize civilian education 
above essential elements of the NSW profession, which must come first. The issue is 
timing. Further research should determine precisely how NSW integrates civilian 
education in to the development pipeline. A recent study for the U.S. Army’s Chief of 
Staff looked at the issue of career progression and development timing. It suggests that 
civilian graduate education and fellowships should be experienced prior to battalion-level 
command but only after attending both intermediate and advanced levels of military 
education.130 Based on the findings contained in this research, this approach (as 
                                                 
130 Ross Coffman and Chris Donahue, Foster, Mike, Riga, Chris and Symes, Kim. “Developing 
Strategic Leaders in the United States Army.” (Fellowship Research for the Chief of Staff of the U.S. 




described in Developing Strategic Leaders in the United States Army) is both sensible 
and viable, and will directly benefit the NSW community in the execution and 
accomplishment of future missions. This project’s final recommendations are 
summarized in Figure 15.   
 
 
Figure 15.  Summary of Project Recommendations  
 
 
Project Recommendations (for O-5 and O-6 Echelon Task Forces):  
1. Place greater emphasis on deployed senior leadership skills and seek immediate investment 
in existing professional development opportunities that cover the subjects contained in this 
research (Appendix A). To achieve this goal the community must broadcast this objective 
(proficiency in O-5 and O-6 echelon task force leadership roles) as the desired end state for 
officers, chief warrant officers, and enlisted members to work toward. Further research must 
also be commissioned to identify how to implement improved professional development 
using the methodology and data contained in this research. 
 
2. Mandate feedback from SEALs who are privileged with key leadership opportunities so that 
the community may learn from their experiences. Archive these records to create a valuable 
database so that NSW can monitor progress and continuously refine the development 
process. 
 
3. NSW-specific leadership development is necessary but not sufficient for continued success. 
Therefore, further research should also identify how to complement military development 
with exposure to civilian programs (civilian education, fellowships, etc.). 
 54
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 55
APPENDIX A. 2014 NSW PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
PRIORITIES  
  
2014 NSW Professional 
Development Topics Rated by 









1 ISR Integration and Employment Systems  Movement and Maneuver  5.68 0.5
2 
Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-
making Leadership 5.68 0.6
3 
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and 
Disseminate (F3EAD) Targeting  Intelligence 5.62 0.7
4 ISR Employment and Integration  Intelligence 5.58 0.8
5 
Battle Staff or JOC Procedures (i.e., Practical 
Application of C2 during Mission Execution) Movement Maneuver  5.55 0.9
6 
Practical Application of Fires Approvals and 
Employment Fires 5.52 0.9
7 
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty 
Evacuation (CASEVAC)  Protection  5.52 0.9
8 Authorities and Approvals Leadership 5.51 0.8
9 Intelligence Agencies (NSA, CIA, DIA)  Command and Control 5.48 0.8
10 Irregular Warfare (Population Centric) Leadership 5.47 0.9
11 Operational (Wins Campaigns) Leadership 5.45 0.6
12 
Enemy, Detainee, Collateral Damage 
Considerations Leadership 5.43 0.8
13 Preparation of the Environment Leadership 5.42 0.7
14 
Recent NSW History (lessons learned from 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines, etc.) Leadership 5.40 0.8
15 
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Casualty 
Evacuation  Sustainment 5.37 1.0
16 Counter Terrorism Leadership 5.35 0.9
17 Tactical / Operational Case studies Leadership 5.35 0.8
18 Rotary Wing Operations  Movement and Maneuver  5.30 1.0
19 Commander’s Visualization  Command and Control 5.29 0.8
20 Counter Insurgency Leadership 5.28 0.9
21 Public Speaking Leadership 5.27 0.9
22 Law of Armed Conflict Leadership 5.27 1.0
23 Fires Targeting Process Fires 5.26 1.0
24 
Fires Case Studies (Good, Bad, and Lessons 
Learned) Fires 5.25 1.0
25 Signals Intelligence  Intelligence 5.25 0.9
26 Mission Command  Command and Control 5.24 0.8
27 Team Building  Leadership 5.23 1.2
28 Theater Level Intelligence  Intelligence 5.21 1.0
29 Joint Service Operations  Command and Control 5.19 1.0
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2014 NSW Professional 
Development Topics Rated by 









30 Human Intelligence  Intelligence 5.19 0.9
31 Direct Action Leadership 5.19 1.0
32 State Department and Embassy  Command and Control 5.17 1.0
33 Special Reconnaissance Leadership 5.17 1.1
34 Unconventional Warfare Leadership 5.17 1.1
35 Friendly Fires Capabilities Fires 5.16 1.1
36 Joint Fires Fires 5.14 1.0
37 Operational Risk Management  Movement and Maneuver  5.14 1.3
38 Combined Arms / Joint Warfighting  Movement and Maneuver  5.13 1.0
39 Battle Tracking Systems Command and Control 5.10 1.0
40 Operational Security (OPSEC)  Protection  5.10 1.2
41 Military Decision Making Process  Command and Control 5.09 1.0
42 SOF Operational Doctrine and Design Leadership 5.06 0.9
43 Enemy Fires Capabilities Fires 5.05 1.1
44 Negotiations Leadership 5.05 1.0
45 
General Intelligence or the Intelligence 
Process  Intelligence 5.04 1.2
46 Green on Blue Counter Measures  Protection  5.04 1.1
47 Strategic (Wins Wars) Leadership 5.01 1.1
48 Sea Basing Movement and Maneuver  4.99 1.2
49 Tactical (Wins Battles) Leadership 4.97 1.2
50 
Joint / Conventional Force Planning and 
Integration  Movement and Maneuver  4.97 1.1
51 Cyber Security  Protection  4.96 1.1
52 Funding (Pots of Money)  Sustainment 4.96 1.0
53 National Level Intelligence  Intelligence 4.93 1.1
54 Human Domain / Network Analysis  Intelligence 4.92 1.1
55 U.S. Policy Considerations Leadership 4.92 1.2
56 Culture Considerations  Command and Control 4.91 1.0
57 Integration with Surface Ships Movement and Maneuver  4.91 1.2
58 
U.S. Service Member Medical Treatment 
Considerations  Protection  4.91 1.2
59 Fixed Wing Operations  Movement and Maneuver  4.90 1.1
60 
Military Advisor (to Foreign Military Leaders 
and Organizations)  Command and Control 4.88 1.1
61 Regional Studies  Command and Control 4.88 1.0
62 Indirect Fires Fires 4.87 1.1
63 Force Protection and Security  Protection  4.86 1.2
64 
Negotiating / Cooperation Building with 
Foreign Cultures  Command and Control 4.84 1.1
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65 Maritime Interception Operations Movement and Maneuver  4.84 1.1
66 
Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service 
Support (CSS) Considerations  Sustainment 4.83 1.0
67 
Department of Justice and Law Enforcement 
(FBI, NCIS, et al.)  Command and Control 4.82 1.1
68 Security Force Assistance Leadership 4.82 1.0
69 Special Boats integration Movement and Maneuver  4.82 1.1
70 Counter Intelligence Intelligence 4.81 0.9
71 Maneuver Warfare  Movement and Maneuver  4.81 1.0
72 Information Operations Leadership 4.79 1.1
73 
Combined or Multinational Operations 
(NATO, Allied and Coalition Partners)  Command and Control 4.77 1.1
74 Conventional Warfare (Enemy Centric) Leadership 4.77 1.3
75 Amphibious Operations / Littoral Movement and Maneuver  4.75 1.2
76 Knowledge Management Intelligence 4.74 1.1
77 Personnel Recovery  Protection  4.74 1.2
78 Foreign Disclosure of Intelligence Intelligence 4.69 1.2
79 Non-lethal Fires  Fires 4.67 1.2
80 Air over Water Operations Movement and Maneuver  4.66 1.2
81 Network Operation and Capabilities  Command and Control 4.65 1.1
82 
Combined (Multinational) Intelligence 
Collaboration Intelligence 4.65 1.1
83 Mobility and Counter Mobility  Movement and Maneuver  4.64 1.1
84 Joint Special Operations History Leadership 4.63 1.1
85 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Employment  Protection  4.63 1
86 Non-standard or Low Visibility Logistics  Sustainment 4.59 1.3
87 
Casualty / Mortuary Affairs, Employment of 
Mental & Spiritual Support  Leadership 4.58 1.1
88 
Theater Security Cooperation, Counter-Narco 
Terrorism Training, and Joint Combined 
Exchange Training Leadership 
4.56 1.1
89 U.S. Funding Categories Leadership 4.55 1.2
90 
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs and 
BILATs) Leadership 4.5 1.2
91 Joint Logistics Operations  Sustainment 4.5 1.2
92 Civilian Medical Treatment Considerations]  Protection  4.49 1.2
93 
Multi-National Medical Treatment 
Considerations  Protection  4.45 1.3
94 Emergency Support Requests Sustainment 4.43 1.2
95 Parachute Operations  Movement and Maneuver  4.39 1.3
96 
Force Health Protection and Preventative 
Medicine  Protection  4.35 1.3
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97 Contracting  Sustainment 4.34 1.3
98 NSW History Leadership 4.31 1.2
99 NSW Riverine Operations Movement and Maneuver  4.31 1.1
100 Strategic Lift Operations  Movement and Maneuver  4.26 1.1
101 SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Integration Movement and Maneuver  4.21 1.4
102 Foreign Aide and Logistic Support / Funding  Command and Control 4.16 1.2
103 Naval Special Warfare Submarine Operations Movement and Maneuver  4.04 1.4
104 Cyber-Network Policy  Command and Control 4.01 1.3
105 Enemy Medical Treatment Considerations  Protection  4.01 1.4
106 Joint Logistics Reporting  Sustainment 4.01 1.1
107 Tactical Radio Operation and Capabilities  Command and Control 3.94 1.3
108 USAID  Command and Control 3.82 1.4
109 Chemical and Biological Protection Measures  Protection  3.68 1.2
110 Humanitarian Organizations  Command and Control 3.67 1.4
111 Air Defense Protection 3.56 1.3
 
**Any subject with a mean rating above 4.5 (numbers 1–91) was considered by survey 
participants to be Highly Important to NSW leaders assigned to O-5 and O-6 echelon task 
forces (according to Table 6). 
 
**All of the subjects (numbers 92–111) were still rated above the mid-point (3.5), falling 
in the category of Important to NSW leaders assigned to O-5 and O-6 echelon task forces 
(according to Table 6).  
 
**As previously discussed in Chapter II, Section E, it was determined that if two means 
differ by 0.3 or more, that difference is statistically significant (p<.05).  However, if two 
means differ by less than 0.3, that difference is not statistically significant, so the ratings 
should be treated as equal in importance. 
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APPENDIX B. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Table 21.   Assessment versus Recommendations (List of Answer 
Frequencies from Questions 26 and 30).  
Preparation Event Assessed:  % Response Frequencies 
(1-6 Rating Scale) 
1          2           3          4           5          6 
Way Ahead: % Response 
Frequencies (1-6 Rating Scale) 
1          2           3          4           5          6 
Command and Control  9          8          15        29         32        7  3         0          0          3          17        77  
Leadership  11        8          13        28         23       17 2         0          3          3          19        73 
Movement and Maneuver  8          9          11        21         31       20 3         0          4         12         33        48 
Intelligence 16        19        23        21         19        2 2         0          3         14         34        47 
Fires 15        15        17        29         21        3 3         0          3         20         33        41 
Sustainment 15        16        26        30         10        3 1         0          6         22         33        38 
Protection 14        10        23        24         24        5 33       0          7         29         28        33 
 
Table 22.   Preparation for Individual Positions (List of Answer 
Frequencies for Questions 27 and 31).  
Personnel Assignments Assessed:  % Response Frequencies 
(1-6 Rating Scale) 
1          2           3          4           5          6 
Way Ahead: % Response 
Frequencies (1-6 Rating Scale) 
1          2           3          4           5          6 
Tactical Elements (Troop and 
Below) 8          7          11        23         26       25  1          4          6          13        15        61  
Commanders 6          4          23        21         39        7 1          0          4          2          6          87 
Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs) 14        6          17        27         33        3 2          0          4          7          16        71 
Deputy Commanders 12        12        16        26         30        4 1          1          2          10        25        61 
Operations SEAs 16        13        10        39         19        3 2          0          3          4          44        47 
Operations Officers 13        14        22        33         17        1 1          0          1          3          25        70 
Executive Officers 12        17        23        25         22        1 2          0          6          11        37        44 
Operations Warrant Officers 22        22        23        26         7          0 3          7          4          16        39        31 
Command Warrant Officers 30        21        24        17         8          0 3          10        11       21         21        34 
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APPENDIX C. QUALITATIVE RESULTS  
A. SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE QUESTION 29 
First, 20 people mentioned that on-the-job training (OJT) was the most critical 
aspect of their preparation. Four example statements are listed below.  
 Nothing prepares you more for Command Leadership than experience 
gained during multiple deployments in a Joint Atmosphere. If you haven’t 
gained real world insights and dealt with them on a daily basis while 
deployed in a combat environment then no matter the amount of education 
you receive, your leadership will be marginal. Education relies on events 
and actions of the past... when faced with problems in real time you must 
have a combination of good practices in the past as well as reactive 
measures to counter act the present. Not everyone is meant to lead just 
because of their rank or their education. 
 I’ve never had any formal staff preparation - all acquired via OJT and 
promotion to positions of greater responsibility. 
 I would rate the self-training/OJT working at a SOTF/TSOC/CJSOTF 
ICW JMPE 2 as the most valuable training opportunities. NSW does an 
exceptional job on tactical training. However, understanding and using 
MDMP, graphics, ORDERS, integrating into conventional battle-space, 
working with other joint forces etc., are barely addressed - especially 
when compared to SF. 
 In my particular case the keys to initial success were: 1) previous TSOC 
tour, 2) previous interagency experience, 3) civilian postgraduate degree, 
4) sense of humor. 
Second, there were nine mentions that Joint Exercises were critical to their 
preparation. Two example statements are listed below. 
 I would have selected on the job training along with SITEX, CERTEX, 
FBP. The exercises I have participated in were very effective to prepare 
me. Of course this went hand-in-hand with on the job training. 
 The only way that a TF sized element can truly adequately prepare to 
function as a TF is to be TF. This means bringing all the teams and groups 
under the TF together and running them through the ringer. This allows 
any shortfalls or kinks in the armor to be found and fixed, but more 
importantly, it teaches everyone how the TF will problem solve when the 
unknowns happen. 
Third, four mentions that joint professional education was critical in their 
preparation. Three example statements are listed below. 
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 Prior to deployment—attended the former JOINT STAFF Course—TF 
focused—very helpful. 
 JPME is great book knowledge that applies to working in a joint 
environment. Although, most of my experience has been on the job 
training. NSW does a terrible job building visionary leaders or fostering an 
environment for strategic thinking. NSW needs to invest in more than just 
tactical leaders and more in developing its senior leaders. 
 JSOF SEA was invaluable. 
Fourth, there were 20 mentions indicating that NSW professional development 
requires improvement to prepare leaders for O-5 and O-6 task force level roles. Two 
example statements from survey participants are listed below. 
 Prior combat experience, while valuable, can potentially be a double-
edged sword, leading some to think that they know more than they do due 
to prior experiences. A balance between the wisdom accumulated through 
prior combat activities, and a receptiveness to new situations where old 
lessons may not necessarily be applicable, is probably optimal.  
 Unlike other services that have established schools at which many of these 
skills would be taught, it is impractical to do that for a few hundred NSW 
officers in the Navy. What this means is that the extent of professional 
education will vary widely from one officer to the next depending on his 
experience as opposed to his counterpart from the Army, for example, 
who will surely learn certain things at certain points in his career. 
Correcting this would require a formal curriculum and career path that 
achieves certain joint education and training milestones. The Army 
Captains Career Course is 22 weeks long before O3 command. We have 
nothing like that. 
Finally, there were five comments that did not answer the question directly but 
pointed to other community issues. One example is listed below. 
 Also, not all NSW commands deploy, or deploy in the same manner. 
SEAL Teams deploying to OIF/OEF became somewhat standardized, but 
the deployment of SBT, SDV, and SA function differently and may not 
deploy at all. 
B. SUMMARY OF QUESTION 33  
There were a total of 33 participants took the time to write support for improving 
NSW professional development in accordance with this study’s suggestions. The input 
totaled seven pages (single spaced and 12-point font). This section breaks the responses 
into two categories: supportive and cautionary. 
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1. Supportive Responses 
The most common comment (fourteen mentions) was a statement involving the 
need to rectify missing or enhance professional development. Specifically, Officers 
careers in general, Senior Enlisted Advisors prior to assignment on an Operations Team, 
and the Warrant Officers were repeatedly mentioned. Four examples of recommendations 
surrounding these gaps include the following statements from participants. 
 Tactically I have been well prepared for my deployments… however we 
cannot stay “On Target” our whole careers and JPME COIs are a way to 
prepare use for “Big Picture” type jobs. Currently, NSW CWO’s do not 
have a required JPME COI. So, everything I have learned has been 
through trial and error. Trial and error is one way to learn however I think 
there are much better ways.  
 If NSW can’t build and sustain an O3 PME, consider attending (whole or 
portions) USA or USMC O3 PME (EWS or Captain’s Course). 
 The skill sets needed to function effectively as a tactical NSW leader and 
as a relatively senior Joint commander vary greatly. NSW has a good 
pipeline for the tactical piece, but the Joint assignments tend to be more ad 
hoc. Formalizing it would be helpful. The future is also Joint, and this 
should be an area of emphasis.  
 The two week XO school is substandard in preparing an executive officer 
to fill primary responsibilities: what right looks like in detailing 
(staggering PCS shifts of wardroom); disciplinary measures, reviewing 
and emending Operation Orders to support CO’s vision, command way 
ahead. There are no prerequisite TSOC indoctrination or staff schools in 
NSW prior to OPS, XO tours. This hinders us when compared to SF field 
grade peers that have the institutional background in writing theater 
campaign plans. NSW is exceptional at crisis response but falls short in 
developing campaign plans for an area of responsibility because of limited 
knowledge in how to do it. JPME I and II at NPS is a secondary effort to 
receiving the MS in Defense Analysis. And it’s mostly centered on 
conventional operations, which also applies to war colleges. 
The second most common theme had thirteen mentions. They included statements 
that generally supported a Career long program that culminates by producing effective O-
5 and O-6 echelon leaders. Three examples of these recommendations are provided 
below. 
 Troop CDRs should receive an ILC-equivalent COI. CDRs should receive 
something useful for the CO course from NSW or USSOCOM that 
prepares them for the operational environment. JPME 2 or Senior War 
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College should be a requirement for command - not something the CO 
screening board views as a period where an office is not contributing to 
the community. 
 As NSW pulls out of Afghanistan and pulled out of Iraq (in force), the 
lessons there do not necessarily translate directly to AOs like AFRICOM 
and SOUTHCOM. NSW is a small force and cannot be everywhere at 
once and cannot be experts at conducting O5/O6 Task Force missions in 
the various AOs. There must be a pipeline for Commanders to learn the 
nuances of commanding an O5/O6 level TF in various AOs. Simply going 
down and sitting with the General or his Ops O doesn’t cut it. Shaking 
hands and getting “guidance” does not always translate well to 
successfully executing that guidance. Again, our force is small, and one 
bad mistake by a leader affects the reputation and trust of the entire force. 
 In general, we have tactical leadership training covered. We should focus 
on operational and strategic level education for ‘top five’ and management 
skills for Departmental, Troop, and Platoon leaders.  
The third category “other” included nine novel recommendations. They included 
recommendations for investment in micro-education, Interagency, logistics training, war-
gaming, more joint exercises, looking at other services professional development 
pipelines, and suggestions for re-analyzing NSW task organization. Four examples of 
these recommendations are provided below. 
 Incorporation of senior leader decision making training scenarios and 
vignettes at the operational and strategic level -- similar to the tactical-
level practical exercises promulgated in the Ethos magazine last year, but 
at the operational level focused on campaign planning and incorporating 
conventional forces, enablers, logistics, authorities, funding and country 
team level issues. 
 JSOU needs to become a greater part of NSW’s educational investment 
pipeline for SEAL Officers, senior enlisted and SBT warrants, enlisted. 
Navy War College in Newport, RI is not a substitute to providing the 
asymmetric and unconventional warfare schooling background our leaders 
need on a routine basis; every two years there should be mandatory formal 
education for at least two weeks. How does Apple’s operations team 
manage day-to-day business? What about senior level business practices 
by Google Executives? Why not make no-kidding Intel training by the 
CIA mandatory for upcoming SEAL CDRs/CMCs? Shouldn’t some 
courses at JSOU be mandatory or us? We can be so much better as a force. 
There needs to be a re-focused effort in short, intense executive education 
(outside of conventional war colleges) beyond the tactical level (two 
weeks to 1–2 months every two years at least) for our upcoming command 
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team leaders (O4-O-6, E7-E9). Keep our brightest minds intellectually 
stimulated through continuous investment of executive education. 
 I believe we need to work harder up front with our young officers to treat 
their career as a profession...to treat their junior years as the equivalent of 
a ‘residency’ on their way to being future TF leaders, with the ultimate 
goal of commanding. Enforcement of the NSW Officer career path (with 
mandatory Diversity tours between leadership tours) helps, and there are 
all kinds of other opportunities with the current forward TF’s operational 
today. 
 Although most of our NSW officers lament their staff tours, I find that 
very few actually understand or even value staffing. This is evidenced in 
the placement of NSW officers. Consider the SEAL Team. Under the 
current construct, there are 27 SEAL officers at the SEAL Team. Of those 
27 officers, just one is in staff--the Operations officer. That means that 
exactly 1/27 or 4% of the wardroom is in staff at a Battalion level 
command. In the same construct, there are 15 SEAL CPOs, including the 
OPS MCPO and CMC. Of those 15 SEAL CPOs, four of them are in staff, 
including one E9. That equates to 30 of the SEAL Chief Mess is in staff. 
That ratio is completely inverted. This same construct will then form a 
TG/SOTF/Battalion battle-staff. That staff will be made up of entirely 
non-SEAL personnel. Under this model, there is no way for a SEAL 
officer to learn the staff side of the house. 
2. Cautionary Statements 
There were a total of eleven cautionary mentions or suggestions that fell outside 
of that provided by military channels, totaling about three pages (single spaced and 12-
point font). The most common recommendation with five mentions in the qualitative 
section was prioritizing diverse civilian perspectives over military professional 
development. Three examples of recommendations for increased civilian interaction 
include the following statements from survey participants. 
 The “leadership” warfighting function might benefit most from exposure 
to civilian agencies...both the U.S. IA community, but also corporate 
leadership, academic leadership, NGO leadership, civilian academic 
programs, etc. This recommendation may seem in some ways to be 
counterintuitive, but it shouldn’t be...even among the broad range of 
students attending service schools, there are limitations to the breadth of 
perspective, and there is great potential for “group think,” or “limited 
think,” even among very bright leaders who are under the impression that 
they are embracing divergent perspectives. Understanding how foreign 
diplomats, or foreign-based NGO leaders, or UN-affiliated organizations 
view U.S. hegemony, could help better inform U.S. military leaders...not 
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by changing their views, but by helping them develop a more complete 
understanding of regional/global concerns, thereby becoming better 
equipped to find enduring solutions to the US’ challenges. 
 Need more civilian schools...from well respected universities. Project 
Management, decision making, speaking, writing.” 
 In addition to JPME, NSW leaders should become familiar with other 
high-performance organizations, to include for-profit business and 
technology companies (Google, Apple). This may help prevent a reliance 
on standard military structures and may help to keep pace with topics like 
social media exploitation, cyber warfare, and IT network issues. 
The second category was “other” in the qualitative section. These statements were 
diverse covering topics of being a self-starter, to building relationships, and issues with 
NSW task organizations. Two examples of these recommendations include the following 
statements from survey participants. 
 A good leader has the discipline and drive to do all the other things to 
prepare himself for the upcoming tasks assigned. 
 Ideally, the 05/06 Commander is comfortable in the Joint realm and well 
versed in intelligence. The Commander does not need to be a fires, JAG 
and intel SME, but needs to cultivate a staff relationship with these key 
entities that is very close. 
There were three statements that cautioned against spending too much time off the 
battlefield. For example, one participant stated that NSW leaders who were “out of touch 
with the deploy-ers” had “huge impacts on the lives of those under them.” These 
participants seemed to think anytime off the battlefield was potentially detrimental to 
NSW’s performance. The other two cautionary statements are listed below. 
 Deployment experience is invaluable, as are exercises as shake-outs for 
the real thing. I’m concerned that occasionally a leader spends too much 
time in other staff assignments with insufficient battlefield experience, 
then finds himself in a command position deployed. Tours in acquisitions, 
personnel, and training commands prepare leaders for organizational 
leadership, but they do not prepare a leader for combat leadership roles. 
 Will this make us better fighters on the battlefield” ???...or just better 
negotiators within the Joint realm, I guess only time will tell. From my 
experience.... early on in conflicts you need warfighters...good ones! .... 
later on after establishment of forces you need the education of everything 
this survey represents. Education is an element of War, ‘but’ Men are the 
difference makers... be that good or bad. So I ask you.... where do the 
Leaders of these men make the difference? ‘something to ponder... 
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APPENDIX F. EMAIL INVITATION 
From: Teti, Jeremiah (LCDR) [mailto:jjteti@nps.edu]  
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 1:36 AM 
To: NSW Survey Distro 
Cc: Wisotzki, Stephen C CAPT USSOCOM NAVSOC; Voigt, Bradley D Mr CIV 
USSOCOM NSWCEN 




You are invited to participate in a study designed to support the Naval Special Warfare’s 
Professional Development and Education program. It is endorsed by the Center for SEAL 
and SWCC and will be conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School under the 
supervision of Professor Kalev Sepp (Primary Investigator) and Professor Susan Hocevar 
(Co-Investigator). I will be the student investigator for the research as part of my master’s 
thesis project. This survey intends to capitalize on your experience, which was gained 
over the last thirteen–plus years of running Joint & Multi-national Task Forces. The 
research question: What are the practical skills required to be a SEAL leader today and 
are these competencies being built into future leaders?  
  
Procedures: It will take place online - simply click the link {below}. The first page will 
repeat some of this information and asks you to give your consent to take the survey. 
There are 33 questions and it should not take more than 30 minutes to complete. Once 
you start the survey, you cannot stop part way through and finish it later; it must be done 
in one sitting due to the anonymity settings.  
  




Disclaimer: You will see the same info (below) on the first page of the survey as part of 






Anticipated Benefits: The results of this study will support the Navy, United States 
Special Operations Command, and Naval Special Warfare by capturing your experiences, 
opinions, and advice on how to best prepare tomorrow’s leaders for Task Force 
leadership roles. 
  
Cost: No financial cost to participate in this research study. 
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Compensation for Participation: No compensation will be given. 
  
Voluntary Study: Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to 
participate, you can still change your mind at any time, and withdraw from the study 
without penalty.  
  
Potential Risks: Although unlikely because of software safeguards, a potential risk of 
participating might be, if an electronic breach of confidentiality occurred and your 
identity was revealed, then an unauthorized person or persons could see your responses. 
  
Mitigation of Risks: No responses will be attributable to you due to the fact that the 
survey asks for only limited PII (personally identifiable information) and the Lime 
Survey software maintains participant anonymity. Additionally, the survey records will be 
stored on government computer systems and a secure website. 
  
Confidentiality & Privacy Act: Any information that is obtained during this study will 
be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be 
made to keep your personal information confidential, but total confidentiality cannot be 
absolutely guaranteed. 
  
Points of Contact: If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you 
experience an issue or have questions about your experience while taking part in this 
study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev Sepp, 831–656-
2116, kisepp@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other 
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